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Abstract

The relationship between corporate governance and firm disclosure for
firms in crisis, specifically firms in violation of GAAP, may differ from the
relationship demonstrated in prior literature between governance and voluntary
disclosure. An emerging stream of disclosure literature assumes that the
relationship between corporate governance and misstatement disclosure choices
mirror that found in prior voluntary disclosure literature though no study has
empirically demonstrated that a similar relationship exists. Using a sample of
302 accounting irregularities disclosed between 2000 and 2006, I investigate the
role of corporate governance, including both internal and external mechanisms,
in influencing misstatement disclosure timeliness. I provide empirical evidence
consistent with the value of in-the-money stock options incentivizing
management to disclose material misstatements in a less timely manner and a
non-linear relationship between management ownership and timeliness where
lower levels of ownership improve timeliness and higher levels of ownership
inhibit timeliness. The results also suggest that greater board independence,
CFO turnover prior to the end of the misstated period, and greater risk of civil
litigation improve misstatement disclosure timeliness, while greater board size
and board classification have the opposite effect.
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1. Introduction

Over the past decade and as recently as 2011, the U.S. Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC) has voiced its concern with the lack of urgency
demonstrated by firms in disclosing misstatements uncovered in the firm’s prior
financials. A preliminary look at the timeliness of misstatement disclosures
reveals that the SEC has good reason to be concerned. In 2006, the final year in
this study’s sample, 74 of 200 misstatements (37%) were disclosed more than
two fiscal quarters after the end of the affected financials.
While it is unlikely that the time taken to disclose a misstatement is driven
entirely by management, strategic behavior may reduce misstatement disclosure
timeliness if utility maximizing managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) seek to
avoid losses of personal wealth and reputation (Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki,
2009) due to firm value destruction accompanying misstatement revelations
(Ettridge et al., 2010; Hennes, Leone, and Miller, 2008a; Palmrose, Richardson,
Scholz, 2004; Anderson and Yohn, 2002; Kinney and McDaniel, 1989;
Srinivasan, 2005).
Assuming investors prefer more timely financial information over less
timely when making investment decisions, management’s actions to disclose in a
less timely manner are inconsistent with investor preferences. As a solution to
the agency costs associated with this inconsistent behavior, Jensen and
Meckling (1976) theorize that shareholders can employ compensation incentives
and incur monitoring costs in an effort to better align management’s incentives
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with their own. While the prior misstatement disclosure literature has
investigated the consequences of strategic misstatement disclosures such as
Files (2011) investigation into the association between disclosure timeliness and
the likelihood and level of SEC penalties and Myers, Scholz, and Sharp (2011)
investigation into the market’s reaction to management’s choice of more obscure
disclosure venues, no study has investigated the role of corporate governance in
influencing misstatement disclosure timeliness.
There is sufficient reason to believe that the role of corporate governance
in influencing misstatement disclosure choices may differ from prior evidence of
its relationship with voluntary disclosures such as management forecasts. Daily,
Dalton, and Cannella (2003) argue that the relationship between governance and
firm performance is situation dependent thus limiting generalizability. They
explain that the relationship between corporate governance and firm
performance can vary between a firm in crisis and a firm not in crisis. In the case
of financial misstatements, firms that violate GAAP are often in crisis as
evidenced by their poor performance, high leverage, and limited cash-flow from
operations (Ettridge et al., 2010; Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson, 2010;
Palmrose et al., 2004; Richardson, Tuna, and Wu, 2002; Kinney and McDaniel,
1989). This is the opposite of firms disclosing earnings forecasts which are often
better performers (Lev and Penman, 1980; Miller, 2002). The association
between misstatement disclosure and changes in stock liquidity and cost of
capital following disclosure is consistent with a firm in crisis. While management
forecasts (i.e. voluntary disclosure) increase stock liquidity and reduce cost of
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capital (Ajinkya et al., 2005; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005), misstatement
disclosures result in the opposite and increase bid-ask spreads1 (Anderson and
Yohn, 2002), decrease stock liquidity (Bardos, 2011), and increase cost of capital
(Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Hribar and Jenkins, 2004; Kravet and Shevlin,
2010).
Using a comprehensive model including both internal and external
governance mechanisms and a sample of 302 accounting irregularities disclosed
between 2000 and 2006, I present empirical evidence of corporate governance
influencing misstatement disclosure timeliness. Specifically, I demonstrate
evidence consistent with the value of in-the-money stock options incentivizing
management to disclose misstatements in a less timely manner and a non-linear
relationship between management ownership and timeliness where the evidence
is consistent with low levels of ownership improving timeliness and high levels of
ownership reducing timeliness. I also find that while greater board
independence, CFO turnover prior to the end of the misstated period, and the
firm’s litigation environment are all associated with more timely misstatement
disclosures, greater board size and board classes are associated with less timely
misstatement disclosures. The findings also provide empirical evidence that
timeliness varies with the type of accounting issue involved in the misstatement.
The remainder of the paper is organized into the following sections.
Section 2 discusses the underlying theory and develops expectations. Section 3
describes the sample selection. Section 4 outlines the methodology and variable
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Huberman and Halka (2001) and Chakravarty and Sarkar (1999) demonstrate a negative
relationship between bid-ask spread and stock liquidity.
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definitions. Section 5 discusses the empirical results. Section 6 discusses
additional analysis. Section 7 concludes.

2. Theory and Expectations
2.1 Misstatement disclosure timeliness
Between 2000 and 20062, the market witnessed a seven-fold increase in
the number of disclosures identifying material misstatements in prior financial
reports (Scholz, 2008; GAO3, 2002; GAO, 2006) and lost over $36 billion in
market capitalization as a result (GAO, 2006). Figure 1 provides a preliminary
look at the timeliness of accounting error and irregularity disclosures over the
same period extracted from the GAO Financial Restatement Database.4 On
average, one-third (one-tenth) of the misstatements were disclosed more than
two (four) fiscal quarters following the end of the misstated period (i.e. after
management resumed reporting in accordance with GAAP).
This high frequency of less-than-timely disclosure has raised considerable
concern from regulators over the last decade. In response to the accounting
scandals of 2002 (e.g. Enron) and in clear acknowledgement of the existing
issue of untimely misstatement disclosures, Section 409 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (SOX) mandated that public issuers disclose material changes in financial
condition in an urgent manner (SOX, 2002). The SEC, charged with protecting
2

Because of restrictions on the availability of required data the study is limited to the period 20002006
3
Government Accountability Office (GAO)
4
Data for the figure is limited to accounting errors and irregularities identified in the GAO
Financial Restatement Database for which an end-date for the misstatement period is identified in
Audit Analytics.
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public investors, implemented the SOX mandate in August 2004 with the release
of Final Rule: Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of
Filing Date (Final Rule 8-K). In Final Rule 8-K, the SEC added a number of new
corporate information events to the list of those requiring a Form 8-K submission
including the determination of the management, auditor, or board that “previously
issued financial statements covering one or more years or interim periods no
longer should be relied upon because of an error in such financial statements”
(SEC, 2004). In addition, the SEC shortened the Form 8-K submission deadline
from 15 days to four days after occurrence of the event to “provide investors with
better and faster disclosure of important corporate events” (SEC, 2004). Post
Final Rule 8-K, timeliness remains a significant concern. In August 2008, the
Advisory Committee on Improvements to Financial Reporting (ACIFR) final report
to the SEC encouraged the regulatory body to further stress timely identification
and disclosure of erroneous financials (ACIFR, 2008) and as recently as
December 2011, the SEC reiterated its mandate “to require clear and timely
disclosure by the market participants it oversees” and to ensure that a “very real
threat of swift and stern enforcement” exists for those who do not meet these
obligations (Gallagher, 2011).
2.2 Strategic misstatement disclosure
Although management is responsible for notifying investors when an error
or otherwise misleading information is detected in prior financial statements
(APB; FASB), managers may take actions to withhold such a disclosure. Agency
theory holds that utility maximizing managers may behave in a manner
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inconsistent with the best interests of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
For example, according to Kothari et al. (2009), management tends to withhold
disclosure of downward adjustments in management forecasts and dividends
and discloses the information only after the benefit to management of withholding
no longer exceeds the cost. They further demonstrate that this tendency is
exacerbated by greater equity ownership and employment risk due to losses in
personal wealth and reputation as a result of the expected negative market
reaction to the bad news.
Following agency theory and the findings from Kothari et al. (2009),
management may be motivated to withhold the disclosure of material
misstatements for at least two reasons. The first is out of concern for wealth
preservation. Given the negative stock returns associated with disclosure of
misstatements in prior period financials (Ettridge et al., 2010; Hennes et al.,
2008a; Palmrose et al. 2004; Anderson and Yohn, 2002), management with
wealth tied to firm value (e.g. ownership, stock options) is likely to incur real
wealth losses associated with a misstatement disclosure. Concerned with wealth
preservation, management may be motivated to withhold the disclosure to avoid
the negative market reaction. The second reason is out of concern for their
reputation and continued employment. Prior literature demonstrates that
managers are held accountable for misstatements. Specifically, shareholders of
misstating firms question management credibility (Kinney and McDaniel, 1989)
along with accounting practices and disclosure quality (GAO, 2002; Anderson
and Yohn, 2002). Managers of misstating firms also find that their reputation is

7

tarnished (Srinivasan, 2005) and their future employment is jeopardized (Ettridge
et al., 2010; Hennes et al., 2008a; Hennes, Leone, and Miller, 2010) following the
disclosure. Concerned over loss of reputation and employment, managers may
be motivated to withhold the misstatement from the market.
As Kothari et al. (2009) explains for manager’s withholding negative
forecast adjustments, there is likely a cost/benefit decision for withholding
misstatement disclosures where once the costs of withholding the information no
longer exceeds the benefit to management the misstatement is disclosed. Just
where the shift in balance between benefits and costs occurs likely varies for
each misstatement. In some cases, management may withhold the disclosure
long enough to lock in profits while the firm is overvalued which is consistent with
Beneish (1999) findings of increased insider selling prior to misstatement
disclosure. In other cases management may withhold until the end of their term
which would be consistent with studies such as Hennes et al. (2008a) that find
increased senior management turnover following misstatement disclosure.
Kothari et al. (2009) suggests that management withholds long enough to bury
bad news with good news. Consistent with Kothari et al. (2009), Myers et al.
(2011) finds that management withholds misstatements long enough to disclose
them obscurely in lengthy periodic reports. History also demonstrates that
scrutiny from regulators such as investigations can lead to misstatement
disclosure (Palmrose et al., 2004; Hennes et al., 2008a).
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2.3 Costs of strategic misstatement disclosure
Prior literature has demonstrated that management’s decision to withhold
bad news from the market can result in significant costs to the firm in the form of
civil litigation and regulatory penalties. Under Rule 10b-5 (10b-5), investors are
able to seek redress for harm caused by relying on misstated financial
statements provided they meet the requirements to establish a claim. One such
requirement is evidence of management’s intent to deceive the investor. Where
it can be demonstrated that management delayed the disclosure of the
misrepresentation there is an increased likelihood of civil litigation (Skinner,
1994; Field, Lowry, and Shu, 2005). The same literature also notes that the
delay in disclosure increases the cost of litigation defense and settlement by
increasing the litigation window and the number of investors harmed.
Costs to the firm of management’s disclosure choice may also include
increased regulatory attention. Files (2011) demonstrates that less forthright
misstatement disclosure results in an increased likelihood of SEC sanctions and
increased monetary penalties for the firm. To be more exact, for each week it
takes management to disclose a material misstatement, the average firm incurs
an additional $443,000 in corporate penalties (Files, 2011).
2.4 Corporate governance and misstatement disclosure
Management’s strategic disclosure behavior represents an agency cost to
owners. Where agency costs exist because management’s behavior diverges
from owner preferences, shareholders can employ compensation incentives and
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incur monitoring costs in an effort to align management’s behavior (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976).
While the influence of corporate governance on management disclosure
practices is not a new subject, results from prior literature studying the influence
of corporate governance on voluntary disclosure may not be generalizable to
misstatement disclosures. Daily et al. (2003) explain that the relationship
between corporate governance and firm performance can vary between a firm in
crisis and a firm not in crisis. For example; the relationship between firm
bankruptcy and institutional ownership depends on whether it is studied prior to
the financial crisis, during the financial crisis, or following the financial crisis
(Daily et al., 2003). Firms that violate GAAP are often in crisis as evidenced by
their poor performance, high leverage, and limited cash-flows from operations
(Ettridge et al., 2010; Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson, 2010; Palmrose et al.,
2004; Richardson, Tuna, and Wu, 2002; Kinney and McDaniel, 1989). This is the
opposite of firms disclosing earnings forecasts which are often better performers
(Lev and Penman, 1980; Miller, 2002). The association between misstatement
disclosure and the change in stock liquidity and cost of capital is consistent with a
firm in crisis. While management forecasts (i.e. voluntary disclosure) increase
stock liquidity and reduce cost of capital (Ajinkya et al., 2005; Karamanou and
Vafeas, 2005), misstatement disclosures result in the opposite and increase bidask spread5 (Anderson and Yohn, 2002), decrease stock liquidity (Bardos, 2011),

5

Bid-ask spreads are commonly used in the literature as a proxy for stock liquidity. The greater
the bid ask spread the less liquid the stock (Huberman and Halka, 2001; Chakravarty and Sarkar,
1999).
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and increase cost of capital (Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Hribar and Jenkins,
2004; Kravet and Shevlin, 2010).
2.5 Bundling effect
Prior governance literature demonstrates the need to study alternate
governance mechanisms (internal and external) simultaneously as the absence
of a comprehensive design ignores the complementary and substitution effects
(trade-offs) between the various governance mechanisms, commonly referred to
as the bundling effect (Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Zajac and Westphal, 1994;
Rediker and Seth, 1995; Laux and Laux, 2009; Cheng and Indjejikian, 2009).
2.6 Internal governance mechanisms
Owners have options for reigning in self-interested management. They
can offer incentives to better align management behavior and they can incur
costs necessary to monitor management and limit their divergent behavior
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). What mix of each mechanism owners choose is
beyond the scope of this study but has been shown to depend on both firm
specific factors such as organizational complexity and firm risk (Beatty and Zajac,
1994; Zajac and Westphal, 1994) and external factors such as the takeover,
labor, and product markets (Cheng and Indjejikian, 2009).
2.6.1 Incentive compensation
Stock options and stock ownership link management’s personal wealth to
shareholder wealth and provide management with incentives to take actions
aligned with shareholder interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), though their use
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can be a “double-edged sword” both motivating management to avoid taking
actions that destroy firm value while at some point comprising enough of
management compensation to incentivize risk-avoidance (Zajac and Westphal,
1994). While Kothari et al. (2009) finds that management’s tendency to withhold
downward adjustments in management earnings forecasts is exacerbated by
greater management ownership; the role of incentive mechanisms in influencing
management’s misstatement disclosure choices has yet to be empirically
investigated. Greater compensation incentives, by design, likely sensitize
management to the loss in firm value historically associated with misstatement
disclosures and rather than encourage disclosure may instead discourage
disclosure in an effort to preserve their personal wealth. Although management
may choose to withhold disclosure initially, at some point the benefit to
management (e.g. wealth preservation) of withholding may no longer exceed the
cost of withholding (e.g. regulatory sanctions and penalties) leading management
to release the disclosure (Kothari et al., 2009). Therefore, I expect that
management with greater wealth tied to firm value through stock options and
stock ownership will be less timely in their misstatement disclosures.
2.6.2 Board monitoring
While owners are concerned with management behaving in their best
interests, portfolio diversification reduces the incentive for and efficiency of
individual shareholder monitoring (Fama, 1980; Bhide, 1994). Where ownership
is not concentrated, boards are the most efficient means with which to hire, fire,
compensate, and monitor management (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Since owners
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incur monitoring costs for the purpose of aligning management behavior with
their own interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), it follows that more effectively
monitored management will be more timely in their misstatement disclosures.
Prior literature demonstrates that greater board independence improves
the effectiveness of board monitoring by reducing the influence of management
on the board. For example; insider dominated boards offer weaker monitoring as
executives in effect self-monitor and may have significant influence over those
responsible for monitoring (e.g. career advancement) (Beatty and Zajac, 1994)
and board independence has been shown to have a positive association with
board committee independence and a negative association with earnings
management (Beasley and Salterio, 2001; Klein, 2002; Vafeas, 2005). Since
boards with greater independence better represent shareholder interests, I
expect that firms with more independent boards will have more timely
misstatement disclosure.
Board size may also influence the boards monitoring effectiveness. A
greater number of directors can complicate coordination (Eisenberg, Sundgren,
and Wells, 1998; Yermack, 1996) and lengthen the board decision making
process (Shaw, 1976; Smith et al., 1994) consistent with smaller boards offering
more effective monitoring. Given the demonstrated relationship between smaller
boards and more effective monitoring, I expect that firms with smaller boards will
have more timely misstatement disclosure.
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2.6.3 Senior management dismissal
Threat of dismissal is a valuable governance mechanism employed by the
board (Walsh and Seward, 1990) and is the “ultimate sanction” used to influence
management behavior (James and Soref, 1981; Weisbach, 1988; Huson,
Parrino, and Starks, 2001). Tasked with hiring and firing senior management
(Fama and Jensen, 1983), it is the board’s responsibility to monitor and remove
management who underperform or otherwise behave inconsistently with
shareholder preferences (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1989). In the context of
misstatements the board may choose to replace senior management that is
either complicit in the misrepresentation or unwilling to properly disclose the
misstatement. Where outgoing management is terminated for poor performance,
the incoming manager may credibly blame the outgoing manager for current
problems and take measures to “clean the books” with little reputational costs to
the incoming manager (Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993). In the case of
misstatement disclosures, new managers will likely seek to disclose any
misrepresentations that occurred during the prior management’s tenure. If
incoming management seeks to “clean the books,” I expect more timely
misstatement disclosure as the result of senior management turnover.
2.7 External governance mechanisms
The corporate control market is a strong external governance mechanism
that motivates management to maximize firm value under threat of takeover
(Walsh and Seward, 1990). While the market exists, management can take
measures designed to circumvent the threat of takeover (Walsh and Seward,
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1990; Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009). These
anti-takeover measures serve to entrench management and further separate
management from ownership. A highly successful and often used anti-takeover
measure is the staggered or classified board (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005;
Bebchuk et al., 2009). The presence of a classified board decreases the
attractiveness of takeovers to prospective acquirers by preventing the immediate
transition of management. With respect to misstatement disclosures, I expect
that classified boards will shield management from threat of takeover allowing
them to make disclosure decisions that are suboptimal to investors and reduce
disclosure timeliness.
Large shareholders, such as institutional owners, also serve as external
monitors of management. Institutional shareholders often own considerably
more shares than individual investors (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Dharwadkar et
al., 2008) making the cost of shirking their monitoring role much higher than that
of more diffuse owners which serves as an incentive to “attend to the tasks of
ownership” (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). Bushee and Noe (2000) demonstrate an
association between higher institutional ownership and more forthcoming
disclosure. Contrary to the above theory, Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta (2005)
find that the private benefits and information generated from institutional
ownership decrease the likelihood of voluntary disclosure. Given the mixed
results from prior literature, I do not have an expectation for the role of
institutional ownership in influencing misstatement disclosure timeliness.
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In investigating auditor specialization, Dunn and Mayhew (2004) provide
evidence that audit quality plays a role in enhancing client disclosures. The
results imply that greater audit quality provides more effective monitoring of the
firm’s financial reporting process. Since the financial reporting process includes
management’s disclosure decision, I expect that greater audit quality will
influence management to comply with regulatory disclosure requirements and
disclose misstatements in a timely manner.
Finally, the firm’s securities litigation environment may also serve as an
external governance mechanism. Firms that face greater litigation risk, such as
firms in industries prone to class action lawsuits, are more likely to issue
voluntary disclosures (e.g. earnings warnings) (Skinner, 1994; Field et al., 2005).
As a governance mechanism the threat of civil litigation may influence
management’s misstatement disclosure behavior. If greater litigation risk
increases the cost to management of strategically disclosing misstatements, I
expect that managers facing greater litigation risk will issue more timely
misstatement disclosures.

3. Sample Selection

The sample begins with 582 accounting regularities identified by Hennes,
Leone, and Miller (2008b) from the GAO Financial Restatement Database for the
period 1997-2006. I restrict the sample to accounting irregularities for two
reasons. First, the expected market reaction, threat of litigation, and turnover are
all more severe for irregularities than for accounting errors (Palmrose et al.,
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2004; Hennes et al., 2008a). The goal of this study is to determine if corporate
governance influences management’s misstatement disclosure decisions and
this influence is most likely to be seen where management has the greatest
incentive to behave strategically. In other words, I am more likely to find
management taking actions to protect their personal wealth tied to firm value and
protecting their employment and reputation where these things are most
threatened. Likewise, I am more likely to see the effects of board monitoring on
disclosure timeliness where the divergence between management self-interest
and investor interest is greatest. Second, measuring timeliness as the number of
days between the end of the misstatement period and the date of the
misstatement disclosure is rather noisy. Myers et al. (2011) explains that a
limitation of the measure is that timeliness is jointly determined by how quickly
management detects the misstatement and how quickly management discloses
the misstatement. By restricting the sample to accounting irregularities the
measure is less likely to be impacted by the former as management is or should
be aware of intentional misrepresentation (Hennes et al., 2008a).
The sample was further restricted to those observations for which
misstatement details were available from the Audit Analytics - Audit NonReliance Database. There were 103 observations that occurred between 1997
and 1999 that were eliminated from the sample because the availability of nonreliance data begins in 2000. There were another 130 observations eliminated
because there was no matching non-reliance data. Out of the remaining 349
observations 47 were missing required governance data. Governance data was
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hand collected from firm 10-K and DEF-14 (Proxy) submissions available through
the SEC-EDGAR database. Firm characteristics were collected from Compustat
Fundamentals – Annual. Any missing firm characteristics were hand collected
from 10-K submissions. Data necessary to calculate the magnitude of the
earnings misstatement was collected from the Compustat Un-restated “As First
Reported” Database. Any missing un-restated information was hand collected
from representative misstatement disclosures (e.g., press releases, 8-Ks, 10-Ks).
The sample selection procedures are summarized more concisely in Table
16 along with the sample distribution by year and industry. The GAO dataset
ends in June 2006 which explains the low number of observations for the final
year of the sample. Table 1 also introduces the timeliness measure,
TIMELINESS, and provides the average number of days taken to disclose the
sample’s accounting irregularities by year and industry. There is no statistical
difference between the mean TIMELINESS for each year and industry.

{Insert Table 1: Sample selection and distribution}

4. Methodology

I conduct a multivariate analysis of the association between misstatement
disclosure timeliness (dependent variable) and both internal and external
governance mechanisms (independent variables) controlling for misstatement
6

Out of the 302 disclosure observations there are 16 firms with two disclosures and one firm with
three disclosures. The study’s conclusions are robust to the exclusion of firms with multiple
disclosures.
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severity and complexity (both likely to influence disclosure timeliness) and firm
characteristics that have been shown in prior literature to influence
management’s disclosure choices. Since the dependent variable measures the
duration of time between the end of the misstated period and the misstatement
disclosure, the study utilizes a proportional hazard model (Cox Partial
Likelihood)7 to estimate the parameters of the variables of interest. Hosmer and
Lemeshow (1999) explain that the proportional hazard model can be used when
the purpose of the analysis is to determine the influence of covariates on
duration. The study’s sample consists of single observations for each
misstatement and the duration to disclosure is known for each observation (i.e.
all observations are failures). In addition, all explanatory variables are measured
once for each misstatement (i.e. time invariant). Finally ties are resolved using
Breslow (1974) approximations.

TIMELINESS

i





 IN-THE-MONEY EXERCISABLE , IN-THE-MONEY UN-EXERCISABLE ,
i

i

CEO OWNERSHIP ,CEO OWNERSHIP SQUARED , BOARD INDEPENDENCE ,
i

i

i

BOARD SIZE , CEO TURNOVER , CFO TURNOVER ,CLASSIFIED BOARD ,
i

i

i
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4.1 Dependent variable
The number of days between the end of the misstatement period and the
misstatement disclosure date has emerged as the accepted measure for the

7

The study’s findings and conclusions are robust to using a simpler exponential model;

E( y i )  e xi  .

19

timeliness of misstatement disclosures (Files, 2011; Myers et al., 2011). While
the exact cause for the variation in disclosure timing is not known, it is likely to be
associated with the quality of internal controls (detection), complexity of the
accounting issue, and management’s disclosure timing decision. By restricting
the sample to accounting irregularities, I attempt to remove the noise associated
with detection of accounting errors which can be difficult for management to
detect even in firms with strong internal accounting processes. Any noise due to
detection that remains in the irregularity sample is likely to be negligible since
accounting irregularities involve intentional misrepresentation which management
either knew about or should have known about had they been diligent in their
duties. I further attempt to isolate managements timing decision by controlling for
the complexity of the accounting issue involved in the misstatement. Since
timeliness is proxied by the number of days between the end of the misstatement
period and the misstatement disclosure date, the greater the value of
TIMELINESS, the less timely the disclosure.
4.2 Independent variables
The independent variables were hand collected from company proxy
statements and periodic filings due to limited firm coverage from available
governance datasets such as Execucomp and the Corporate Library. The only
exception is institutional ownership which was extracted from the CDA/Spectrum
Thomson Financial services database. Unless otherwise stated, the independent
variables were measured at the end of the year preceding the end of the
misstated period (i.e., the last period affected by the GAAP violation).
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4.2.1 CEO Stock Options
Meant to serve as a long term incentive for the maximization of firm value,
significant stock option accumulation can have an incongruent effect on
management behavior (Zajac and Westphal, 1994). For instance, in periods of
overvalued equity, management with significant in-the-money options are more
likely to issue financial statements that violate GAAP in order to support the firm’s
short-term stock price (Efendi et al., 2007). I hand collect the value of both inthe-money options that are exercisable and in-the-money options that are unexercisable from company periodic filings and proxy statements. The two values
are calculated by taking the difference between the option strike price and the
market price of the underlying stock and multiplying the result by the number of
shares at the given strike price and summing across contracts. To control for
heteroscedasticity in CEO sensitivity to the level of in-the-money stock options, I
follow Efendi et al. (2007) and scale the value of the options by the CEO’s total
pay (salary + bonus). I include two stock option variables; one for IN-THEMONEY EXERCISABLE and one for IN-THE-MONEY UN-EXERCISABLE.
Given the findings in Efendi et al. (2007), I expect that CEO’s with greater in-themoney exercisable stock options will be more sensitive to the short-term stock
price and will take longer to disclose misstatements. Although un-exercisable
options likely incentivize a longer horizon, their effect may be overshadowed by
short term incentives (e.g. wealth preservation) from exercisable options. For
this reason, I do not have an expectation for how in-the-money un-exercisable
options should influence disclosure timeliness.
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4.2.3 CEO Ownership
Within agency theory, CEO ownership serves to align management’s
behavior with shareholder interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Subsequent
literature has identified a tradeoff between low levels of ownership that serve to
align CEO interests and greater levels of ownership that foster CEO
entrenchment and suggest that the relationship between the level of CEO
ownership and the alignment of interests is non-linear (Jensen and Warner,
1988; McWilliam, 1990; Sundaramurthy, 1996). These findings are consistent
with the management disclosure literature demonstrating that lower levels of
CEO ownership are associated with a greater likelihood of issuing management
forecasts (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005) and increased voluntary disclosure
quality (Eng and Mak, 2003). To control for this non-linearity in CEO ownership, I
follow Sundaramurthy (1996) and include a variable for both the percentage of
CEO ownership (CEO OWNERSHIP) and the percentage of CEO ownership
squared (CEO OWNERSHIP SQUARED). CEO ownership is calculated as the
number of shares owned by the CEO divided by the number of shares
outstanding, both measured at the end of the year preceding the end of the
misstated period. Data necessary to calculate CEO ownership was hand
collected from company periodic filings and proxy statements. Given the nonlinear relationship between CEO ownership and the voluntary forecast disclosure
exhibited in prior literature, I expect that CEO ownership will incentivize
management to disclose misstatements in a more timely manner, though as
ownership increases the timeliness of disclosure will decrease as the CEO’s
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interests diverge from the owners. In other words, I expect to see a curvilinear
relationship between CEO ownership and misstatement disclosure timeliness
similar to that demonstrated in the prior literature for voluntary disclosure.
4.2.4 Board Independence
Greater outside membership on the board of directors decreases insider
influence and strengthens the board’s ability to effectively monitor management
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Beatty and Zajac, 1994). I calculate BOARD
INDEPENDENCE as the number of outside directors8 serving on the board,
divided by the total number of directors. Board information was hand collected
from company periodic filings and proxy statements. I expect that management
monitored by boards with greater board independence will be more timely in their
misstatement disclosures.
4.2.5 Board Size
The size of the firm’s board of directors can affect its ability to monitor
management. Small boards (less than 7 or 8 directors) are more likely to
function effectively and are more difficult for the CEO to control (Jensen, 1993).
BOARD SIZE is measured as the number of directors serving on the board and
was hand collected from company periodic filings and proxy statements. If
smaller boards are more effective monitors, I expect that management monitored
by smaller boards will disclose misstatements in a more timely manner.

8

Directors who are not employees of the firm and who are not relatives of employees of the firm
are classified as outside directors.
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4.2.6 Senior management dismissal
Should the board find it necessary, it has the ability to replace senior
management (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Since incoming management often use
the earlier part of their tenure as an opportunity to “clean the books” and have the
ability to blame discrepancies on outgoing management (Murphy and
Zimmerman, 1993), I expect that replacing senior management should lead to
more timely misstatement disclosure. Given their joint responsibility for financial
reporting, I include a variable for both CEO TURNOVER and CFO TURNOVER.
I measure turnover as a change in the name of the executive in the year the
misstatement period ends from that reported one year preceding the end of the
misstated period. CEO and CFO names are hand collected from company
periodic filings and proxy statements.
4.2.7 Classified boards
A classified, or staggered, board is the quintessential takeover defense
(Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Bebchuk et al., 2009). Whether included in the
charter or by-law, classified boards prevent acquirers from replacing the entire
board at one time by staggering director terms (usually over the period of three
years), making the acquisition less attractive. The concern for shareholders is
that classified boards may entrench management, increasing agency costs by
further driving a wedge between management and owners (Walsh and Seward,
1990). CLASSIFIED BOARD is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the board is
classified and 0 otherwise. I identify classified boards as having two or more
classes of directors listed in their company periodic filings or proxy statements for
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the year ending before the end of the misstated period. Since a classified board
further separates management for ownership, I expect that its presence reduces
the cost to management of taking actions inconsistent with owner preferences
and may result in less timely misstatement disclosure.
4.2.8 Institutional ownership
Evidence from the prior literature concerning the role of institutional
ownership in aligning management disclosure practices with shareholder
preferences is mixed. While Bushee and Noe (2000) demonstrate an association
between higher institutional ownership and more forthcoming disclosure, Ajinkya
et al. (2005) finds that the private benefits and information generated from
institutional ownership decrease the likelihood of voluntary disclosure. Given the
mixed results, I do not have an expectation for the role of institutional ownership
in influencing misstatement disclosure timeliness. I extract the number of
outstanding shares held by institutional owners from the CDA/Spectrum
Thomson Financial Services (13F filings) database. I measure the percentage of
institutional ownership at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstated
period and calculate the variable, INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP, as the number
of shares owned by institutions divided by the number of shares outstanding.
4.2.9 Audit quality
Dunn and Mayhew (2004) demonstrate that industry-specialist audit firms
have a positive association with disclosure quality. If this association is effected
through greater auditing quality offered by specialization, audit quality in a more
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general sense may influence management’s disclosure practices. DeFond
(1992) finds that name-brand is a good substitute for more complex measures of
audit quality. If audit quality is associated with greater monitoring of
management’s disclosure practices, I expect that management subject to a
higher quality auditor will disclose misstatements in a more timely manner. I use
Audit-Analytics to identify firms that have Big X auditors contracted at the end of
the misstated period. Following DeFond (1992), AUDIT QUALITY takes the
value of 1 if the firm has a Big X auditor contracted at the end of the misstated
period and 0 otherwise.
4.2.10 Litigation environment
Management facing greater litigation risk is more likely to voluntarily
disclose bad news (Skinner, 1994; Field et al., 2005). I classify firms as
operating within a highly litigious environment if their sector9 has an above
average percentage of firms with new securities litigation filings from 20002006.10 The frequency of new securities litigation filings is provided by the
Stanford Securities Litigation Clearinghouse. This process results in classifying
the financial, health care, information technology, telecommunication services,
and utilities sectors as highly litigious. LITIGATION RISK is measured as an
indicator variable and takes the value of 1 if the firm is a member of one of the
five “high litigation” sectors and 0 otherwise.

9

As identified under the Global Industry Classification System (GICS).
The period was chosen to coincide with the sample period.

10
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4.3 Control variables
Control variables that measure the characteristics of the given
misstatement disclosure are measured at the time of the disclosure with the
exception of the magnitude of the misstatement in income, which is measured
after completion of the restatement. Firm characteristics are measured at the
end of the year preceding the end of the misstated period.
4.3.1 Accounting issue
Just as financial transactions vary in complexity, misstatements in
transactions vary in complexity. Sorting through a revenue recognition issue or
merger issue may be more complex than sorting through a selling, general, and
administrative (SG&A) expense issue. I include a series of control variables to
capture this variation in timeliness attributable to characteristics of the underlying
accounting issue. I include a control variable for REVENUE RECOGNITION
ISSUE, LEASE ISSUE, INVENTORY ISSUE, MERGERS & ACQUISITION
ISSUE, SG&A EXPENSES ISSUE, DEFERRED TAXES ISSUE, ACCRUALS
ISSUE, and INTANGIBLE ASSETS ISSUE. 11 All accounting issues were
measured as indicator variables and take the value of 1 if the misstatement
involves the accounting issue and 0 otherwise. It is possible for misstatements to
involve more than one accounting issue. Accounting issue data was extracted
from the Audit Analytics – Non-reliance Database.
11

Palmrose at al. (2004) introduce a continuous variable to account for the “pervasiveness” of the
misstatement and is measured as the total number of accounting issues involved in the
misstatement. I use the same accounting issues but decompose the measure into individual
dichotomous variables as I wish to capture changes in the intercept due to particular aspects of
the individual accounting issues.
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4.3.2 Misstatement duration
The duration of misstated periods varies greatly between misstatement
disclosures. Since greater misstatement durations involve multiple periods, the
probability of an outside party such as the SEC or auditor uncovering the
misstatement is likely greater than a misstatement with a shorter duration. The
increased probability that an outside party may uncover the misstatement may
factor into management’s decision to withhold the disclosure. To control for this
probability, I include a control variable for misstatement duration. I follow
Palmrose et al. (2004) and calculate MISSTATEMENT DURATION as the
number of quarters misstated divided by 4. Data necessary to calculate the
misstatement duration was extracted from the Audit Analytics – Non-reliance
Database.
4.3.3 Magnitude of misstatement in income
Consistent with the association of misstatement magnitude with
misstatement severity (Palmrose et al., 2004) and misstatement disclosure
timeliness (Myers et al., 2011) in the prior literature, I control for the magnitude of
the misstatement of income. I calculate the MISSTATEMENT IN INCOME as the
cumulative difference between the corrected net income and the as-first-reported
net income extracted from the Compustat Un-restated Database over the
duration of the misstated period. To control for heteroscedasticity, I scale the
cumulative difference by firm assets measured one year prior to the end of the
misstated period.
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4.4.4 Post-SOX announcement
SOX implementation has changed the landscape of misstatement
disclosures (Scholz, 2008). Misstatements disclosed post-SOX involve lower
dollar amounts and are less likely to involve fraud and core income items (Burks,
2011; Hennes et al., 2008; Scholz, 2008). SOX holds management to a higher
disclosure standard likely increasing the cost to management of withholding a
misstatement disclosure. I classify misstatement disclosures as a post-SOX
announcement if the disclosure is released after August 29, 2002, the effective
date of the SOX legislation (SOX, 2002). POST-SOX ANNOUNCEMENT is an
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the misstatement disclosure occurs
after August 29, 2002 and 0 otherwise.
4.4.5 Post-Final-Rule 8-K announcement
Final Rule 8-K became effective on August 23, 2004, and requires firms to
disclose material misstatements within four days of determining that prior
financials can no longer be relied upon by investors for decision making (SEC,
2004). The purpose of the regulation was to dissuade firms from making initial
disclosure of the misstatements in periodic submissions and instead disclose in
the more transparent, event-driven, Form 8-K. Myers et al. (2011) finds that
firms are more likely to disclose misstatements using the Form 8-K following the
implementation of Final-Rule 8-K. I classify misstatement disclosures as a postFinal-Rule 8-K announcement if the disclosure is released after August 23, 2004.
POST-FINAL-RULE 8-K ANNOUNCEMENT is an indicator variable that takes
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the value of 1 if the misstatement disclosure occurs after August 23, 2004 and 0
otherwise.
4.4.6 Firm size
I include a variable for firm size to control for the known association
between larger firms and higher voluntary disclosure quality (Eng and Mak,
2003). FIRM SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s book value
of total assets one year prior to the end of the misstated period. Asset data was
extracted from Compustat – Annual12.
4.4.7 Firm leverage
Eng and Mak (2003) further find that firms with lower debt have higher
voluntary disclosure quality so I include a variable for firm leverage to control for
the impact of debt on management decisions across debt levels (Ettridge et al.,
2010; Palmrose et al., 2004; Richardson et al., 2002; Kinney and McDaniel,
1989). FIRM LEVERAGE was calculated by dividing the firm’s book value of
long-term debt by the firm’s book value of total assets both measured one year
prior to the end of the misstated period. Debt and asset data was extracted from
Compustat – Annual.

12

Misstatement disclosure fiscal year may differ from the calendar year of the disclosure. For this
reason, the announcements in this study are aligned with their fiscal year before matching with
Compustat firm data. Approximately one-fifth of the restatements in the sample required
alignment before merging with control data.
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4.4.8 Temporal and industry effects
I control for industry13 and year fixed effects to capture shifts in the
timeliness of misstatement disclosures over time and industry disclosure
practices.
4.5 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics on the variables measuring
disclosure timeliness, corporate governance, misstatement characteristics, and
firm characteristics. On average, accounting irregularities in the sample took 170
days to disclose, overstated net income by 4.1% of assets, and impacted 2.5
years of financials. The time elapsed before disclosure is consistent at the mean
and median with summary statistics in both Files (2011) and Myers et al. (2011).
Out of the 302 observations, 49% involved revenue recognition, 11% involved
leases, 21% involved inventory, 13% involved mergers and acquisition, 23%
involved selling, general, and administrative expenses, 12% involved deferred
taxes, 30% involved accruals, and 3% involved intangible assets. Consistent
with irregularities being more pervasive (Palmrose et al., 2004) and involving
earnings manipulation (Ettridge et al., 2010; Hennes et al., 2008; Richardson et
al., 2002; Beneish, 1999), 48% of the misstatements involve multiple accounting
issues and 71% involve revenue recognition, inventory, and/or accruals.
The average misstating CEO owns 7% of the firm’s outstanding stock and
has over 4 times (2 times) their total salary in value from in-the-money
exercisable stock options (in-the-money un-exercisable stock options). The
13

I use the same industry classification utilized in Song and Walkling (1993).
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average board has 8 directors and 78% on average are outsiders. Over 26% of
the CEOs and 40% of the CFOs were replaced in the year prior to the end of the
misstated period. A large number of the firms (54%) have classified boards and
over 86% have a Big X auditor at the end of the misstated period. The mean
institutional ownership is 43% and over 58% of the firms operate in a highly
litigious sector.
Finally, the sample’s mean firm size is $685M (unreported) and firm
leverage is 22%. The mean firm size is greater than that for the Compustat
universe over the same period, which is consistent with Ettridge et al.’s (2010)
findings that fraud firms tend to be larger in size. The mean leverage is also
greater, which is consistent with prior literature finding a positive association
between misstatements and financial distress (Ettridge et al., 2010; Palmrose et
al., 2004; Richardson et al., 2002; Kinney and McDaniel, 1989).

{Insert Table 2: Descriptive statistics}

5. Empirical Results
5.1 Univariate
Table 3 provides the Pearson correlation coefficients for the pairings
between misstatement disclosure TIMELINESS and the study’s governance and
control measures. Three of the internal governance measures demonstrate a
significant univariate association with misstatement disclosure timeliness in the
expected direction and none of the external governance measures demonstrate
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significant univariate association with misstatement disclosure timeliness.
Consistent with the expectation that CEO’s with greater in-the-money exercisable
stock options will be more sensitive to the short-term stock price and will take
longer to disclose misstatements, IN-THE-MONEY EXERCISABLE has a
significant positive correlation with TIMELINESS. Consistent with the
expectation that management monitored by boards with greater board
independence will be more timely in their misstatement disclosures, BOARD
INDEPENDENCE has a significant negative correlation with TIMELINESS.
Finally, consistent with the expectation that incoming senior management looking
to “clean the books” should lead to more timely misstatement disclosure, CFO
TURNOVER has a significant negative association with TIMELINESS.

{Insert Table 3: Pearson correlation matrices}

Table 3 does not demonstrate a significant correlation between CEO
OWNERSHIP and TIMELINESS. To determine if this lack of correlation is
consistent with prior literature’s suggestion that CEO ownership has a non-linear
relation with incentive alignment between the CEO and shareholders (Jensen
and Warner, 1988; McWilliam, 1990; Sundaramurthy, 1996), I look at
TIMELINESS over six stratifications of CEO ownership; starting with five even
quintiles and creating a sixth stratification by segregating from the first quintile
those CEOs with no (zero) ownership in the firm. The sixth stratification is
important for exposition because prior literature leads me to expect a distinct
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difference between no ownership (no alignment) and an epsilon of ownership
(some alignment) (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Eng and Mak, 2003).
Table 4 demonstrates the non-linear relationship between CEO
OWNERSHIP and TIMELINESS. The switch from a monotonic decrease in
TIMELINESS starting with zero CEO ownership to a monotonic increase
beginning in the third quintile is consistent with a curvilinear relationship between
CEO ownership and misstatement disclosure timeliness. The univariate
evidence is consistent with extant literature identifying a shift between low levels
of ownership that serve to align CEO interests and greater levels of ownership
that foster CEO entrenchment suggesting that the relationship between the level
of CEO ownership and alignment of interests is non-linear (Jensen and Warner,
1988; McWilliam, 1990; Sundaramurthy, 1996).

{Insert Table 4: CEO ownership and misstatement disclosure timeliness}
5.2 Multivariate
Table 5 presents the results of the proportional hazard model. The table
includes six models. All of the models include cluster adjusted standard errors
for industry heteroscedasticity and the final model includes dummies for year and
industry. Negative coefficients from the hazard model are interpreted as a
decrease in the rate of a failure (disclosure) occurring in time t conditional on the
failure not occurring in time t-1. Therefore a negative coefficient is interpreted as
contributing to less timely disclosure.
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Model 1 includes the management incentive compensation measures (one
of two sub-sets of the internal governance mechanisms). The measure for the
CEO’s sensitivity to changes in firm value, IN-THE-MONEY EXERCISABLE, is
significant and negative, consistent with greater value from in-the-money
exercisable stock options incentivizing management to disclose misstatements in
a less timely manner. The second stock option measure, IN-THE-MONEY UNEXERCISABLE, is not significant. I did not have an expectation for the second
measure since un-exercisable options likely incentivize a longer horizon, a
horizon that may be over-shadowed by short term incentives (e.g. wealth
preservation) from exercisable options. I included two variables to represent
CEO ownership and capture the expected non-linear relationship. The first, CEO
OWNERSHIP is significant and in the positive direction consistent with CEO
ownership incentivizing management to disclose misstatements in a timely
manner. The second, CEO OWNERSHIP SQUARED is significant and negative.
The significant positive coefficient for CEO OWNERSHIP and the significant
negative coefficient for CEO OWNERSHIP SQUARED are consistent with a nonlinear relationship between CEO ownership and disclosure timeliness where low
levels of CEO ownership incentivize more timely disclosure but at a certain
threshold of ownership the CEO becomes incentivized to disclose in a less timely
manner.
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Model 2 includes the board monitoring measures (the second sub-set of
the internal governance mechanisms).14 The measure of the board’s
independence from senior management influence, BOARD INDEPENDENCE, is
significant and positive, consistent with more effective monitoring of management
leading to better alignment with shareholder interests and more timely
misstatement disclosure. BOARD SIZE, the study’s measure for the board’s
decision efficiency, is not significant in the reduced model. Out of the two
measures for the board’s use of senior management dismissal as a monitoring
mechanism, CEO TURNOVER is not significant and CFO TURNOVER is
significant and positive. Morck et al. (1989) notes that it is generally more difficult
for the board to replace the CEO as opposed to replacing other senior
management. The study may lack significance for the CEO TURNOVER
measure because of this increased difficulty. The significant positive result for
CFO TURNOVER is consistent with incoming CFOs “cleaning the books” and in
the process improving the timeliness of the misstatement disclosure.15
Model 3 includes the external governance measures. The significant
negative coefficient for CLASSIFIED BOARD is consistent with the anti-takeover
defense entrenching management and reducing disclosure timeliness. Given the
mixed findings in prior literature on the influence of institutional investors on firm
disclosure, I did not have an expectation for the study’s measure of institutional
14

Inclusion of a variable for board meeting frequency [un-tabulated] results in a positive and
statistically significant coefficient consistent with greater board involvement generating more
timely disclosure. The study’s primary results are robust to this additional inclusion.
15
The study’s results are robust to controlling for the simultaneous turnover of both the CEO and
CFO in the year prior to the end of the misstated period. The results for inclusion of an
interaction term [un-tabulated] are significant and positive equating to misstatement disclosure
occurring over two times faster than disclosures without prior turnover.
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monitoring, INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP, the results for which are
insignificant. Although the coefficient sign is in the expected direction for AUDIT
QUALITY, the result is not significant. The study’s measure for the firm’s
securities ligation environment, LITIGATION RISK, is significant and positive,
consistent with greater litigation risk increasing the cost to management of
withholding disclosure and therefore incentivizing more timely misstatement
disclosure.
Model 4 includes the misstatement and firm characteristic control
measures. It is interesting to note that disclosure timeliness depends in part on
the accounting issue involved in the misstatement. The coefficient for
MERGERS AND ACQUISTION ISSUE and DEFERRED TAXES ISSUE are
significantly negative based on a two tailed test, suggesting that misstatements
involving mergers and acquisitions or deferred taxes may be more complex or
have other characteristics that require a longer period before disclosure. The
coefficient for LEASE ISSUE is significantly positive based on a two-tailed test,
suggesting that lease issues may be considered less harmful to management,
and therefore, require less time to disclose. The results for both of the study’s
measures for misstatement severity are statistically significant. First,
MISSTATEMENT DURATION is significantly positive consistent with longer
lasting irregularities being disclosed in a more timely manner. Second,
MISSTATEMENT IN INCOME is significantly negative suggesting that more
severe overstatements in income are disclosed in a more timely manner. The
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result for MISSTATEMENT IN INCOME is consistent with findings from Myers et
al. (2011) that demonstrate more timely disclosure for income overstatements.
Model 5 includes all of the internal and external governance measures
and the misstatement and firm characteristic measures. A comprehensive
design that simultaneously considers the internal and external governance
mechanisms acknowledges the complimentary and substitution effects between
mechanisms as demonstrated in prior literature (Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Zajac
and Westphal, 1994; Rediker and Seth, 1995; Laux and Laux, 2009; Cheng and
Indjejikian, 2009). The governance mechanisms and controls maintain the signs
on coefficients and significance levels are consistent with those reported for
Models 1 through 4. When considering the mechanisms simultaneously, the
study’s measure for board decision efficiency, BOARD SIZE, becomes significant
maintaining its negative coefficient from Model 2. The result for BOARD SIZE
provides evidence that smaller boards known for more efficient decisions
(Jensen, 1993) are more effective at aligning management’s behavior with
shareholder preference, resulting in more timely misstatement disclosure.
REVENUE RECOGNITION ISSUE which has a negative and significant
coefficient in Model 5 suggests that there are certain characteristics (e.g.
complexity or severity) of revenue misstatements that lead to less timely
disclosure. FIRM SIZE also becomes significant in Model 5 with a positive
coefficient consistent with prior literature finding greater disclosure quality for
larger firms (Eng and Mak, 2003).

38

Model 616 includes the internal and external governance measures, the
misstatement and firm characteristic measures, and indicator variables to capture
year and industry fixed effects. Because POST-SOX ANNOUNCEMENT and
POST-FINAL-RULE-8-K ANNOUNCEMENT are measured based on time and
over 74% of the disclosures in the sample are announced post-SOX, both
measures are highly collinear with the indicator variables for the year dummies
and are removed from Model 6.17 The internal and external governance
measures from Models 1 through 5 maintain their significance in Model 6 and
demonstrate stable coefficients. The results for the controls also remain
consistent with Models 1 through 5 with the exception of SG&A EXPENSES
ISSUE which has a significant positive coefficient in Model 6 suggesting that
management finds misstatements involving SG&A expenses less threating or
less complex leading to more timely disclosure.18

{Insert Table 5: Misstatement disclosure timeliness: Proportional hazard model}

16

The study’s results are robust to inclusion of controls for management’s choice of disclosure
venue (e.g. Press Release, Form 8-K, Form 10-K/Q) [un-tabulated]. The coefficients for the
venue controls are consistent with expectations established by Myers et al., (2011) with press
releases being the most timely followed by Form 8-K submissions, then Form 10-K/Q
submissions though the resulting coefficients are not statistically significant.
17
Inclusion of POST-SOX ANNOUNCEMENT and POST-FINAL-RULE-8-K ANNOUNCEMENT
in Model 6 despite the collinearity does not alter any of the conclusions drawn from Model 6 as
tabulated though it does make interpretation of the two announcement variables cumbersome
and does not change their overall significance from Table 5.
18
Partitioning the sample into accelerated (148 observations) and non-accelerated (154
observations) filers reveals interesting results. While management’s sensitivity to changes in the
short-term stock price (stock options and ownership) is positively associated with the time
elapsed before disclosure for both accelerated and non-accelerated filers, the proxies for
monitoring effectiveness are only statistically significant for the non-accelerated filers [untabulated].
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5.3 Limitations
The study’s results are limited in their generalizability to the greater
misstatement population. The fact that accounting errors are rather innocuous
when compared to accounting irregularities as evidenced by the greater negative
stock returns around firm’s disclosing the latter (Hennes et al., 2008a), leads me
to believe that management may have less motivation (e.g. wealth preservation)
to behave strategically when it comes to disclosing accounting errors.

6. Additional Analysis
6.1 Misstatement disclosure transparency and corporate governance
The purpose of this section is to determine if disclosure transparency,
another misstatement disclosure choice, is influenced by compensation
incentives, board monitoring, and external governance in a manner similar to
those demonstrated for disclosure timeliness. Since investor’s likely prefer more
transparent information over less transparent, my expectations for the
relationships between the various internal and external governance mechanisms
and transparency are the same as those for the main study.
Table 6 presents the results of a multivariate logit regression with
disclosure in Form 8-K as the dependent variable and the independent and
control variables from the main study. The sub-sample for Table 6 includes only
those misstatements that are disclosed in a Form 8-K or a periodic filing such as
a 10-K or 10-Q. The sub-sample is partitioned into a pre Final-Rule 8-K and a
post Final Rule 8-K since the regulation added financial misstatements as a
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reportable event and compliance likely increased the cost to management of
choosing to disclose in a periodic filing versus the Form 8-K. This design is
consistent with Myer’s et al. (2011) finding that firms are more likely to disclose
misstatements transparently in the Form 8-K than obscurely in a periodic filing
such as a 10-K or 10-Q post Final-Rule 8-K.
Table 6 includes three models, the first model, Model 1, includes the entire
sub-sample of disclosures in 8-Ks, 10-Qs, or 10-Ks. Models 2 and 3 partition the
sub-sample into pre-Final-Rule 8-K and post-Final Rule 8-K.
The results for the transparency model are largely insignificant and fail to
support the majority of the expected relationships with the exception of IN-THEMONEY EXERCISABLE which is significant and negative consistent with wealth
preservation incentivizing less transparent misstatement disclosure.

{Insert Table 6: Misstatement disclosure transparency and governance}
6.2 Accounting error disclosure timeliness
Hennes et al. (2008a) demonstrates a significant difference in the stock
returns to disclosures of accounting irregularities versus stock returns to
accounting errors. They find a more negative return on average for irregularity
disclosures (-14%) than error disclosures (-2%). I restricted my sample to
accounting irregularities recognizing that this greater destruction in firm value
may motivate managers to behave more strategically since the market reaction
to accounting errors is less severe. In other words, I am more likely to find
management taking actions to protect their personal wealth tied to firm value and
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protecting their employment and reputation where these things are most
threatened. This holds for board monitoring as well. I am more likely to see the
effects of board monitoring on disclosure timeliness where the divergence
between management self-interest and investor interest is greatest.
While including accounting errors in the study’s main model and
conditioning on irregularity is an alternate methodology to the one used, hand
collecting the governance data would be very costly and would offer little benefit
should managers prove less concerned about the market’s reaction to an error.
Another option is to extract the governance data from available governance
datasets such as Execucomp, but limited data availability significantly reduces
the sample size and biases the sample toward larger firms (e.g., S&P 1500).
Rather than combine irregularity observations that have hand collected
governance data with error observations that have dataset extracted governance
data, I chose to limit the study’s main sample to accounting irregularities and
save the error sample for additional analysis.
Table 7 presents the descriptive statistics for the accounting error sample.
The sample begins with 2,121 observations from the GAO Financial Restatement
Database classified as accounting errors by Hennes et al. (2008b). Due to data
availability restrictions only 1,095 observations were matched with their
respective misstatement characteristics. Panel B highlights the difficulty in using
available governance databases such as Execucomp and Corporate Library to
extract data necessary for the internal and external governance measures.
Since the number of observations with matching CEO ownership data was less
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than 1%, CEO ownership is not considered in the multivariate analysis that
follows.
{Insert Table 7: Accounting error sample}
Table 8 presents the results of the proportional hazard model and includes
seven variations. Models 7 includes indicator variables to control for year and
industry fixed effects and does not include POST-SOX ANNOUNCEMENT and
POST-FINAL-RULE 8-K announcement following the same rationale given for
Table 5. Model 1 and 2 both demonstrate a significant positive coefficient for
POST-FINAL-RULE 8-K, consistent with improved timeliness following
implementation of the regulation. The significant positive coefficients for
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP and LITIGATION RISK in Model 2 are consistent
with greater institutional ownership and high litigation risk resulting in more timely
disclosure of accounting errors. Model 3 includes CLASSIFIED BOARD without
significant results. Because of the number of observations missing data on
board classification, CLASSIFIED BOARD is not included in Model 6 or 7. The
results of Models 4 through 7 consistently demonstrate a significant positive
coefficient for IN-THE-MONEY EXERCISABLE, opposite the expectation, and in
clear contrast to the findings for accounting irregularities. This result appears to
be consistent with management having greater incentive to withhold the more
severe accounting irregularity disclosures. Model 7 further demonstrates a
significant positive coefficient for BOARD INDEPENDENCE and AUDIT
QUALITY, consistent with greater independence and higher quality audits
improving disclosure timeliness for accounting errors. Finally, the coefficient for
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MISSTATEMENT IN INCOME is consistently negative and significant in Models
3 through 7 consistent with more timely disclosure of accounting errors resulting
in large income overstatements.

{Insert Table 8: Error disclosure timeliness: Proportional hazard model}

7. Conclusions

This study uses variation in the time elapsed between the last financials
misstated and management’s initial misstatement disclosure to measure the
relationship between internal and external corporate governance mechanisms
and misstatement disclosure timeliness. Gaining an understanding of the
relationship between the two is important. Prior literature on the relationship
between governance and voluntary disclosures has limited generalizability to the
misstatement disclosure setting as firms in crisis may demonstrate different
corporate governance relationships compared to firms not in crisis.
Using a proportional hazard model inclusive of both internal and external
governance mechanisms and a sample of 302 accounting irregularities disclosed
between 2000 and 2006, I present empirical evidence of corporate governance
influencing misstatement disclosure timeliness. Specifically, I present evidence
consistent with the value of in-the-money stock options incentivizing
management to disclose misstatements in a less timely manner19 and a non-

19

One standard deviation change from the mean IN-THE-MONEY EXERCISABLE results in a
10% change in the rate of disclosure.
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linear relationship between management ownership and timeliness where the
evidence is consistent with low levels of ownership improving timeliness and high
levels of ownership reducing timeliness20. I also find evidence consistent with
greater board independence21, CFO turnover22 prior to the end of the misstated
period, and the firm’s litigation environment23 contributing to more timely
misstatement disclosure and greater board size24 and board classification25
resulting in less timely misstatement disclosure.

20

th

A one standard deviation increase in CEO ownership from 0.0% (the 25 percentile) results in
a 57% increase in the rate of disclosure, a one standard deviation increase in CEO ownership
th
from 5.4% (the 75 percentile) results in a 42% increase in the rate of disclosure, and a one
th
standard deviation increase in CEO ownership from 32.2% (the 95 percentile) results in a 15%
decrease in the rate of disclosure.
21
One standard deviation change from the mean BOARD INDEPENDENCE results in a 28%
change in the rate of disclosure.
22
CFO turnover prior to the end of the misstated period results in a 32% increase in the rate of
disclosure.
23
Operating in a highly litigious sector results in a 33% increase in the rate of disclosure.
24
One standard deviation change from the mean BOARD SIZE results in a 14% change in the
rate of disclosure.
25
A classified board results in a 15% decrease in the rate of disclosure.
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Figure 1 Misstatement disclosure timeliness (2000-2006)
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Notes:
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b)

Data for the figure is limited to accounting errors and irregularities identified in the GAO Financial
Restatement Database for which an end-date for the misstatement period is identified in Audit Analytics.
The data for CY2006 does not reflect a full year as the GAO Dataset ends June 2006.
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Table 1
Sample selection and distribution by year and industry
Mean # of Days
to Disclose
[TIMELINESS ]

Panel A: Sample selection
Accounting irregularities (initial sample)
Less missing misstatement data
Less missing governance data
Final sample

Panel B: Distribution by year
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

Panel C: Distribution by industry
Chemicals
Communication, Gas, Electric, and Sanitation
Construction
Financial
Food and Tobacco
Hotels, Motels, and Tourism
Leather, Stone
Lumber, Furniture, Paper, and Print
Machinery
Measuring Instruments
Mining
Petroleum and Rubber
Primary and Fabricated Metals
Retail Trade
Services
Textiles and Apparel
Transportation
Wholesale Trade
Miscellaneous

582
233
47
302

# Observations

17
25
55
33
53
82
37

# Observations

21
33
4
41
6
1
1
5
37
14
7
4
5
22
71
6
8
11
5

Percent of
Sample
5.6%
8.3%
18.2%
10.9%
17.5%
27.2%
12.3%

Percent of
Sample
7.0%
10.9%
1.3%
13.6%
2.0%
0.3%
0.3%
1.7%
12.3%
4.6%
2.3%
1.3%
1.7%
7.3%
23.5%
2.0%
2.6%
3.6%
1.7%

170
Mean # of Days
to Disclose
[TIMELINESS ]

150
195
170
165
164
164
189
Mean # of Days
to Disclose
[TIMELINESS ]

179
170
212
166
179
109
217
186
149
150
130
231
187
178
178
183
202
151
140

Panel A outlines the sample selection beginning with the 582 accounting irregularities identified by HLM in
their online dataset. The final sample consists of 302 accounting irregularity observations after eliminating
233 observations for missing misstatement data and 47 for missing governance data necessary to measure
variables used in the study. Panel B provides the sample distribution by year and the mean value of the
study's primary dependent variable, TIMELINESS, for each year. There is no statistical difference between
the mean number of days to disclosure and the sample mean for any of the years. Panel C provides the
sample distribution by industry and the mean value of the study's primary dependent variable, TIMELINESS,
for each industry. There is no statistical difference between the mean number of days to disclosure and the
sample mean for any of the industries.
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics

TIMELINESS
IN-THE-MONEY EXERCISABLE
IN-THE-MONEY UN-EXERCISABLE
CEO OWNERSHIP
BOARD INDEPENDENCE
BOARD SIZE
CEO TURNOVER
CFO TURNOVER
CLASSIFIED BOARD
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP
AUDIT QUALITY
LITIGATION RISK
REVENUE RECOGNITION ISSUE
LEASE ISSUE
INVENTORY ISSUE
MERGERS & ACQUISITION ISSUE
SG&A EXPENSES ISSUE
DEFERRED TAXES ISSUE
ACCRUALS ISSUE
INTANGIBLE ASSETS ISSUE
MISSTATEMENT DURATION
MISSTATEMENT IN INCOME
POST-SOX ANNOUNCEMENT
POST-FINAL-RULE 8-K ANNOUNCEMENT
FIRM SIZE [ln(total assets)]
FIRM LEVERAGE

n
Mean
302 170.16
302
4.21
302
2.06
302
0.07
302
0.78
302
8.25
302
0.26
302
0.40
302
0.54
302
0.43
302
0.86
302
0.58
302
0.49
302
0.11
302
0.21
302
0.13
302
0.23
302
0.12
302
0.30
302
0.03
302
2.57
302 -0.041
302
0.74
302
0.43
302
6.53
302
0.22

Standard Deviation
100.67
12.59
6.93
0.12
0.13
2.64
0.44
0.49
0.50
0.38
0.35
0.49
0.50
0.32
0.41
0.34
0.42
0.33
0.46
0.16
1.69
0.199
0.44
0.50
2.30
0.22

25th percentile
115.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.71
6.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.25
-0.019
0.00
0.00
4.81
0.02

Median
144.00
0.38
0.11
0.02
0.82
8.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.44
1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
2.25
-0.004
1.00
0.00
6.48
0.18

75th percentile
205.00
2.77
1.41
0.05
0.88
10.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.82
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
3.50
0.000
1.00
1.00
7.97
0.34

Table 2 describes the dependent, independent, and control variables used in the study to examine the influence of internal and external governance on the timeliness of
misstatement disclosures. The mean and median TIMELINESS is consistent with summary statistics in both Files (2011) and Myers et al. (2011). Continuous
variables (with the exception of the dependent variable) are winsorized at the top and bottom one percent to mitigate the influence of outliers.
TIMELINESS measures the number of days between the end of the misstatement period and the misstatement disclosure date; IN-THE-MONEY EXERCISABLE
measures the value of the CEO's in-the-money exercisable stock options at the end of the year preceding the misstatement end date and is calculated by taking the
difference between the option strike price and the market price of the underlying stock and multiplying the results by the number of option shares and dividing by CEO
total pay (salary + bonus); IN-THE-MONEY UN-EXERCISABLE measures the value of the CEO's in-the-money un-exercisable stock options at the end of the year
preceding the end of the misstatement period and is calculated by taking the difference between the option strike price and the market price of the underlying stock and
multiplying the results by the number of option shares and dividing by CEO total pay (salary + bonus); CEO OWNERSHIP measures the CEO's stockholdings in the
misstating firm at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period and is calculated by dividing the number of shares owned by the CEO by the
number of shares outstanding; BOARD INDEPENDENCE is calculated by dividing the number of outside directors by the total number of directors both measured at
the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period; BOARD SIZE is the number of directors serving on the board measured at the end of the year
preceding the end of the misstatement period; CEO TURNOVER is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO was replaced in the year prior to the end
of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; CFO TURNOVER is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the CFO was replaced in the year prior to the end of
the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; CLASSIFIED BOARD is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the board has two or more classes of directors at
the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP is calculated by dividing the number of shares
held by institutional owners by the number of shares outstanding, both measured at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period; AUDIT
QUALITY is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has a Big X auditor contracted at the end of the misstated period and 0 otherwise; LITIGATION
RISK is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm operates in a highly litigious sector (financial, health care, information technology, telecommunication
services, or utilities) at the end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; REVENUE RECOGNITION ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the
accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to revenue recognition and 0 otherwise; LEASE ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if
the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to operating or capital leases and 0 otherwise; COST OF GOODS SOLD ISSUE is an indicator variable
that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to cost of goods sold and 0 otherwise; MERGERS & ACQUISITION ISSUE
is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to a merger or acquisition and 0 otherwise; SG&A
EXPENSES ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to selling, general, or
administrative expenses and 0 otherwise; DEFERRED TAXES ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the
misstatement was related to deferred taxes and 0 otherwise; ACCRUALS ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the
misstatement was related to accruals and 0 otherwise; and INTANGIBLE ASSETS ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue
involved in the misstatement was related to intangible assets and 0 otherwise; MISSTATEMENT DURATION is the number of misstated quarters divided by 4;
MISSTATEMENT IN INCOME is measured as the cumulative difference between the corrected net income and the as-first-reported net income over the
misstatement duration; POST-SOX ANNOUNCEMENT is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the misstatement disclosure occurs after August 29, 2002
and 0 otherwise; POST-FINAL-RULE 8-K ANNOUNCEMENT is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the misstatement disclosure occurs after August
23, 2004 and 0 otherwise; FIRM SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets one year prior to the end of the misstated period; FIRM
LEVERAGE is measured by dividing the firm’s long-term debt by the firm’s total assets both measured one year prior to the end of the misstated period.
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Table 3
Pearson correlation matrices

TIMELINESS (1)
IN-THE-MONEY EXERCISABLE (2)
IN-THE-MONEY UN-EXERCISABLE (3)
CEO OWNERSHIP (4)
BOARD INDEPENDENCE (5)
BOARD SIZE (6)
CEO TURNOVER (7)
CFO TURNOVER (8)
CLASSIFIED BOARD (9)
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP (10)
AUDIT QUALITY (11)
LITIGATION RISK (12)
REVENUE RECOGNITION ISSUE (13)
LEASE ISSUE (14)
INVENTORY ISSUE (15)
MERGERS & ACQUISITION ISSUE (16)
SG&A EXPENSES ISSUE (17)
DEFERRED TAXES ISSUE (18)
ACCRUALS ISSUE (19)
INTANGIBLE ASSETS ISSUE (20)
MISSTATEMENT DURATION (21)
MISSTATEMENT IN INCOME (22)
POST-SOX ANNOUNCEMENT (23)
POST-FINAL-RULE 8-K ANNOUNCEMENT (24)
FIRM SIZE (25)
FIRM LEVERAGE

1
1.00
0.12
0.01
0.05
-0.09
0.00
-0.09
-0.11
0.02
-0.01
0.00
-0.09
0.04
-0.08
-0.02
0.13
-0.03
0.09
0.01
0.01
-0.13
0.07
0.05
-0.01
-0.07
0.00

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

1.00
0.33
-0.02
0.00
0.00
-0.03
-0.03
0.02
0.10
0.06
0.14
0.05
-0.01
-0.09
0.02
-0.03
0.05
0.04
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.06
0.05
0.05
0.06

1.00
-0.05
0.08
-0.05
0.15
0.12
0.04
0.03
0.07
0.10
0.04
-0.04
-0.09
0.01
0.00
0.00
-0.08
0.00
-0.07
0.02
-0.04
-0.03
0.00
-0.03

1.00
-0.41
-0.24
-0.16
-0.08
-0.14
-0.25
-0.28
-0.08
-0.05
-0.07
-0.01
0.03
0.01
0.02
-0.04
0.07
-0.16
-0.08
-0.05
0.00
-0.33
-0.04

1.00
0.32
0.07
0.06
0.13
0.16
0.26
0.11
0.07
0.05
-0.04
-0.02
-0.10
0.07
0.05
0.02
0.09
0.29
0.07
0.01
0.32
0.01

1.00
0.08
0.00
0.09
0.17
0.26
-0.07
-0.11
0.20
-0.01
0.03
-0.17
0.00
0.18
0.06
0.16
0.19
-0.01
0.00
0.69
0.26

1.00
0.33
0.11
-0.05
0.13
0.09
0.15
-0.05
0.04
-0.01
0.02
-0.08
0.05
0.04
0.05
0.00
-0.06
-0.11
0.09
0.02

1.00
0.01
-0.10
0.04
-0.03
0.14
-0.03
0.14
0.00
-0.05
-0.08
0.08
0.12
0.03
0.05
0.03
0.04
-0.02
0.00

1.00
0.11
0.18
0.08
0.10
-0.05
-0.04
-0.05
-0.03
0.00
0.00
-0.01
-0.03
0.03
0.07
0.00
0.05
-0.09

1.00
0.28
0.05
-0.09
0.17
-0.08
-0.04
-0.06
0.13
0.16
-0.01
0.18
0.02
0.19
0.11
0.22
0.09

1.00
0.04
0.04
0.09
-0.02
-0.04
-0.05
0.01
0.10
-0.11
0.14
0.22
-0.13
-0.22
0.45
0.12

1.00
0.16
0.00
-0.19
-0.01
0.02
0.13
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.04
0.06
0.02
0.00
-0.21

1.00
-0.14
0.07
-0.05
-0.07
-0.17
0.04
0.00
-0.06
-0.01
0.04
-0.06
-0.08
-0.02

1.00
-0.03
0.05
-0.07
0.03
0.15
-0.06
0.12
0.05
0.14
0.18
0.17
0.08

1.00
0.04
-0.09
-0.14
0.03
-0.04
0.01
0.04
-0.10
-0.07
-0.08
-0.02

1.00
-0.07
0.00
-0.02
0.06
0.03
-0.02
-0.01
-0.10
0.07
0.03

1.00
0.06
-0.03
-0.09
-0.03
-0.04
-0.18
-0.18
-0.09
-0.12

1.00
0.00
-0.06
0.14
0.01
0.13
0.12
0.01
-0.12

1.00
-0.02
0.04
0.09
0.06
-0.02
0.12
0.06

1.00
0.04
0.01
0.05
0.06
0.02
0.12

1.00
0.03
0.21
0.19
0.28
0.11

1.00
-0.03
0.02
0.19
0.04

23

24

25

1.00
0.52 1.00
0.05 -0.02 1.00
0.04 -0.07 0.28

Table 3 presents Pearson correlation coefficients for the study's dependent, independent, and control variables used in the study to examine the influence of internal and external governance on the timeliness of misstatement disclosure.
Continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom one percent to mitigate the influence of outliers. Significant correlations at the 10% level or better are bolded.
TIMELINESS measures the number of days between the end of the misstatement period and the misstatement disclosure date; IN-THE-MONEY EXERCISABLE measures the value of the CEO's in-the-money exercisable stock options at the end of
the year preceding the misstatement end date and is calculated by taking the difference between the option strike price and the market price of the underlying stock and multiplying the results by the number of option shares and dividing by CEO total pay
(salary + bonus); IN-THE-MONEY UN-EXERCISABLE measures the value of the CEO's in-the-money un-exercisable stock options at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period and is calculated by taking the difference between
the option strike price and the market price of the underlying stock and multiplying the results by the number of option shares and dividing by CEO total pay (salary + bonus); CEO OWNERSHIP measures the CEO's stockholdings in the misstating firm
at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period and is calculated by dividing the number of shares owned by the CEO by the number of shares outstanding; BOARD INDEPENDENCE is calculated by dividing the number of outside
directors by the total number of directors both measured at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period; BOARD SIZE is the number of directors serving on the board measured at the end of the year preceding the end of the
misstatement period; CEO TURNOVER is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO was replaced in the year prior to the end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; CFO TURNOVER is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1
if the CFO was replaced in the year prior to the end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; CLASSIFIED BOARD is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the board has two or more classes of directors at the end of the year preceding the
end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP is calculated by dividing the number of shares held by institutional owners by the number of shares outstanding, both measured at the end of the year preceding the end
of the misstatement period; AUDIT QUALITY is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has a Big X auditor contracted at the end of the misstated period and 0 otherwise; LITIGATION RISK is an indicator variable that takes the value
of 1 if the firm operates in a highly litigious sector (financial, health care, information technology, telecommunication services, or utilities) at the end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; REVENUE RECOGNITION ISSUE is an indicator
variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to revenue recognition and 0 otherwise; LEASE ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the
misstatement was related to operating or capital leases and 0 otherwise; COST OF GOODS SOLD ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to cost of goods sold and 0
otherwise; MERGERS & ACQUISITION ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to a merger or acquisition and 0 otherwise; SG&A EXPENSES ISSUE is an indicator
variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to selling, general, or administrative expenses and 0 otherwise; DEFERRED TAXES ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the
accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to deferred taxes and 0 otherwise; ACCRUALS ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to accruals and 0
otherwise; and INTANGIBLE ASSETS ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to intangible assets and 0 otherwise; MISSTATEMENT DURATION is the number of
misstated quarters divided by 4; MISSTATEMENT IN INCOME is measured as the cumulative difference between the corrected net income and the as-first-reported net income over the misstatement duration; POST-SOX ANNOUNCEMENT is an
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the misstatement disclosure occurs after August 29, 2002 and 0 otherwise; POST-FINAL-RULE 8-K ANNOUNCEMENT is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the misstatement disclosure occurs
after August 23, 2004 and 0 otherwise; FIRM SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets one year prior to the end of the misstated period; FIRM LEVERAGE is measured by dividing the firm’s long-term debt by the firm’s total
assets both measured one year prior to the end of the misstated period.
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Table 4
CEO ownership and misstatement disclosure timeliness

CEO OWNERSHIP: Zero
CEO OWNERSHIP: First Quintile
CEO OWNERSHIP: Second Quintile
CEO OWNERSHIP: Third Quintile
CEO OWNERSHIP: Fourth Quintile

8
53
60
61
60

CEO
OWNERSHIP
Min Mean Max
0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.001 0.003
0.004 0.008 0.014
0.014 0.020 0.029
0.029 0.046 0.074

CEO OWNERSHIP: Fifth Quintile

60

0.075 0.252 0.626

n

TIMELINESS
Mean Median
220
169
175
140
158
132
164
139
170
154
177

Table 4 demonstrates the non-linear relationship between CEO ownership and misstatement disclosure
timeliness. The higher the value of TIMELINESS the less timely the misstatement disclosure.
TIMELINESS measures the number of days between the end of the misstatement period and the
misstatement disclosure date; CEO OWNERSHIP measures the CEO's stockholdings in the misstating
firm at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period and is calculated by dividing the
number of shares owned by the CEO by the number of shares outstanding.
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Table 5
Misstatement disclosure timeliness: Irregularity sample - Proportional Hazard Model (Cox Partial Likelihood)

TIMELINESS 
i



 IN-THE-MONEY EXERCISABLE , IN-THE-MONEY UN-EXERCISABLE , CEO OWNERSHIP ,CEO OWNERSHIP SQUARED , BOARD INDEPENDENCE ,
i

i

i

i

i

BOARD SIZE , CEO TURNOVER , CFO TURNOVER ,CLASSIFIED BOARD ,INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP , AUDIT QUALITY ,LITIGATION RISK ,
i

i

i

i

i

i

i

MISSTATEMENT CHARACTERISTICS , FIRM CHARACTERISTICS , YEAR DUMMIES, INDUSTRY DUMMIES)
i

Independent Variables
IN-THE-MONEY EXERCISABLE
IN-THE-MONEY UN-EXERCISABLE
CEO OWNERSHIP
CEO OWNERSHIP SQUARED
BOARD INDEPENDENCE
BOARD SIZE
CEO TURNOVER
CFO TURNOVER
CLASSIFIED BOARD
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP
AUDIT QUALITY
LITIGATION RISK
REVENUE RECOGNITION ISSUE
LEASE ISSUE
INVENTORY ISSUE
MERGERS & ACQUISITION ISSUE
SG&A EXPENSES ISSUE
DEFERRED TAXES ISSUE
ACCRUALS ISSUE
INTANGIBLE ASSETS ISSUE
MISSTATEMENT DURATION
MISSTATEMENT IN INCOME
POST-SOX ANNOUNCEMENT
POST-FINAL-RULE 8-K ANNOUNCEMENT
FIRM SIZE [ln(total assets)]
FIRM LEVERAGE
Industry & Year Dummies
Cluster Adj. Std. Errors: Industry
Model Statistics
n
Wald ChiSqd

i

Model 1
E Coef. H. Ratio z stat.
(-) -0.01 0.99
-6.19 ***
0.00 1.00
0.71
(+) 1.82 6.17
1.79 **
(-) -4.06 0.02
-1.99 **
(+)
(-)
(+)
(+)
(-)

Model 2
Coef. H. Ratio z stat.

0.62
-0.01
0.11
0.22

1.87
0.99
1.12
1.24

Model 3
Coef. H. Ratio z stat.

Model 4
Coef. H. Ratio z stat.

1.48 *
-0.19
0.71
1.57 *
-0.13
0.01
0.03
0.16

(+)
(+)

0.88
1.01
1.03
1.17

-1.43 *
0.07
0.14
1.46 *
-0.12
0.40
0.08
-0.46
0.00
-0.33
-0.03
-0.04
0.08
-0.51
-0.15
-0.06
0.05
-0.30

(+)
(-)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(-)
No
Yes

No
Yes

302
60.1 ***

No
Yes

302
19.9 ***

0.89
1.49
1.08
0.63
1.00
0.72
0.97
0.96
1.09
0.60
0.86
0.95
1.05
0.74

-0.95
2.53
0.64
-3.16
0.03
-2.35
-0.25
-0.17
3.57
-1.63
-0.80
-0.44
1.06
-1.33

**
***
**

***
*

*

No
Yes

302
3.5

Model 5
Coef. H. Ratio z stat.
-0.01 0.99
-2.30
0.00 1.00
0.05
3.53 34.19
2.07
-5.90 0.00
-1.89
1.07 2.92
2.19
-0.06 0.94
-1.73
0.15 1.16
0.99
0.24 1.27
1.54
-0.08 0.92
-0.72
0.01 1.01
0.03
-0.22 0.81
-0.92
0.30 1.35
3.11
-0.22 0.80
-2.04
0.43 1.53
2.29
0.14 1.15
1.03
-0.56 0.57
-3.48
0.03 1.03
0.27
-0.39 0.68
-2.63
-0.01 0.99
-0.13
-0.26 0.77
-1.01
0.08 1.08
2.57
-0.49 0.61
-1.34
-0.24 0.79
-1.16
-0.04 0.96
-0.33
0.10 1.10
2.80
-0.03 0.97
-0.12

**
**
**
**
**
*

***
**
**
***
***

***
*

***

No
Yes

302
162.1 ***

Model 6
Coef. H. Ratio z stat.
-0.01 0.99
-2.33
0.00 1.00
0.31
4.60 99.34
2.07
-7.60 0.00
-1.90
1.88 6.57
2.67
-0.06 0.95
-1.89
0.06 1.06
0.31
0.28 1.32
1.68
-0.17 0.85
-1.33
-0.25 0.78
-1.12
-0.06 0.94
-0.18
0.28 1.33
1.37
-0.41 0.66
-2.75
0.53 1.70
2.72
0.27 1.30
1.50
-0.68 0.50
-3.89
0.21 1.24
1.76
-0.53 0.59
-2.37
-0.04 0.96
-0.32
-0.01 0.99
-0.05
0.07 1.07
1.83
-0.76 0.47
-1.58

0.11
0.10

1.12
1.10

***
**
**
***
**
**
*

*
***
***
***
*
**

**
*

2.87 **
0.33

Yes
Yes

302
1239.4 ***

302
245684.1 ***
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Table 5 uses a Cox Partial Likelhood model and provides the resulting hazard ratios representing the influence of internal and external corporate governance on misstatement disclosure timeliness. Ties in TIMELINESS are broken using Breslow (1974) approximation.
Continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom one percent with the exception of the dependent variable (TIMELINESS) to mitigate the influence of outliers.
*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively, based on a one-tail test if the expectation is given, else a two-tail test.
TIMELINESS measures the number of days between the end of the misstatement period and the misstatement disclosure date; IN-THE-MONEY EXERCISABLE measures the value of the CEO's in-the-money exercisable stock options at the end of the year preceding the
misstatement end date and is calculated by taking the difference between the option strike price and the market price of the underlying stock and multiplying the results by the number of option shares and dividing by CEO total pay (salary + bonus); IN-THE-MONEY UNEXERCISABLE measures the value of the CEO's in-the-money un-exercisable stock options at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period and is calculated by taking the difference between the option strike price and the market price of the underlying
stock and multiplying the results by the number of option shares and dividing by CEO total pay (salary + bonus); CEO OWNERSHIP measures the CEO's stockholdings in the misstating firm at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period and is
calculated by dividing the number of shares owned by the CEO by the number of shares outstanding; BOARD INDEPENDENCE is calculated by dividing the number of outside directors by the total number of directors both measured at the end of the year preceding the
end of the misstatement period; BOARD SIZE is the number of directors serving on the board measured at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period; CEO TURNOVER is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO was replaced in the
year prior to the end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; CFO TURNOVER is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the CFO was replaced in the year prior to the end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; CLASSIFIED BOARD is an indicator
variable that takes the value of 1 if the board has two or more classes of directors at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP is calculated by dividing the number of shares held by institutional
owners by the number of shares outstanding, both measured at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period; AUDIT QUALITY is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has a Big X auditor contracted at the end of the misstated period
and 0 otherwise; LITIGATION RISK is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm operates in a highly litigious sector (financial, health care, information technology, telecommunication services, or utilities) at the end of the misstatement period and 0
otherwise; REVENUE RECOGNITION ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to revenue recognition and 0 otherwise; LEASE ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the
accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to operating or capital leases and 0 otherwise; COST OF GOODS SOLD ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to cost of goods sold
and 0 otherwise; MERGERS & ACQUISITION ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to a merger or acquisition and 0 otherwise; SG&A EXPENSES ISSUE is an indicator variable that
takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to selling, general, or administrative expenses and 0 otherwise; DEFERRED TAXES ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the
misstatement was related to deferred taxes and 0 otherwise; ACCRUALS ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to accruals and 0 otherwise; and INTANGIBLE ASSETS ISSUE is an
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to intangible assets and 0 otherwise; MISSTATEMENT DURATION is the number of misstated quarters divided by 4; MISSTATEMENT IN INCOME is measured
as the cumulative difference between the corrected net income and the as-first-reported net income over the misstatement duration; POST-SOX ANNOUNCEMENT is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the misstatement disclosure occurs after August 29, 2002
and 0 otherwise; POST-FINAL-RULE 8-K ANNOUNCEMENT is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the misstatement disclosure occurs after August 23, 2004 and 0 otherwise; FIRM SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets one
year prior to the end of the misstated period; FIRM LEVERAGE is measured by dividing the firm’s long-term debt by the firm’s total assets both measured one year prior to the end of the misstated period.
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Table 6
Misstatement disclosure transparency and corporate governance
DV = DISCLOSURE IN 8-K

Model 1
Full sub-sample

Independent Variables

E

IN-THE-MONEY EXERCISABLE
IN-THE-MONEY UN-EXERCISABLE
CEO OWNERSHIP
CEO OWNERSHIP SQUARED
BOARD INDEPENDENCE
BOARD SIZE
CEO TURNOVER
CFO TURNOVER
CLASSIFIED BOARD
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP
AUDIT QUALITY
LITIGATION RISK
REVENUE RECOGNITION ISSUE
LEASE ISSUE
INVENTORY ISSUE
MERGERS & ACQUISITION ISSUE
SG&A EXPENSES ISSUE
DEFERRED TAXES ISSUE
ACCRUALS ISSUE
INTANGIBLE ASSETS ISSUE
MISSTATEMENT DURATION
MISSTATEMENT IN INCOME
POST-FINAL-RULE 8-K ANNOUNCEMENT
FIRM SIZE [ln(total assets)]
FIRM LEVERAGE

(-)

Industry & Year FE
White Robust Std Errors
Intercept
Model Statistics
n
Wald ChiSqd

(+)
(-)
(+)
(-)
(+)
(+)
(-)
(+)
(+)

(+)
(-)
(+)
(+)
(-)

Coef. z stat.
-0.018 -1.57 *
-0.016 -0.47
1.796 0.34
-3.143 -0.35
-3.671 -2.18
0.059 0.65
-0.250 -0.54
-0.390 -0.98
-0.782 -2.19 **
-0.221 -0.49
-0.123 -0.21
0.479 1.06
1.053 2.86 ***
0.082 0.14
-0.476 -1.04
0.152 0.29
0.104 0.25
-0.033 -0.07
-0.123 -0.31
-0.231 -0.17
0.261 2.67 ***
-2.169 -0.52
3.144 1.96 **
-0.282 -2.17 **
0.342 0.42
Yes
Yes
1.551

0.64
254
77.85 ***

Model 2
Pre Final-Rule 8-K
sub-sample
Coef. z stat.
0.048 1.67 **
-0.093 -0.88
-4.997 -0.61
9.825 0.67
-1.732 -0.64
0.107 0.79
-0.348 -0.54
-0.268 -0.45
-0.727 -1.09
-0.481 -0.59
-0.681 -0.60
0.274 0.40
0.630 1.18
1.090 1.32
-0.367 -0.63
0.457 0.63
1.226 1.93 *
-1.772 -2.10 **
0.681 1.15
0.039 0.23
-3.696 -0.67

Model 3
Post Final-Rule 8-K
sub-sample
Coef. z stat.
-0.065 -2.88 ***
0.033 0.51
16.024 1.08
-31.709 -1.40 *
-15.162 -3.03
-0.046 -0.23
-0.529 -0.67
-0.834 -1.07
-1.438 -1.93 **
-0.603 -0.76
0.586 0.40
0.103 0.14
2.012 2.08 **
-0.363 -0.37
-1.013 -1.09
-0.130 -0.16
-1.496 -1.21
0.396 0.38
-0.565 -0.70
-0.591 -0.45
0.276 1.26
-0.385 -0.11

-0.148 -0.72
-0.657 -0.47

-0.542 -1.52 *
2.324 1.35 *

Yes
Yes
3.908

1.67 *
124
33.50

Yes
Yes
18.814

4.01 ***
130
62.28 **

Table 6 presents the results from a logit regression of the decision to disclose in Form 8-K on the independent and control variables from the main study.
*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively, based on a one-tail test if the expectation is given, else a two-tail test.
DISCLOSURE IN 8-K takes the value of 1 if the misstatement is disclosed within the Form 8-K and 0 if disclosed in the 10-K or 10-Q; IN-THE-MONEY
EXERCISABLE measures the value of the CEO's in-the-money exercisable stock options at the end of the year preceding the misstatement end date and is
calculated by taking the difference between the option strike price and the market price of the underlying stock and multiplying the results by the number of option
shares and dividing by CEO total pay (salary + bonus); IN-THE-MONEY UN-EXERCISABLE measures the value of the CEO's in-the-money un-exercisable stock
options at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period and is calculated by taking the difference between the option strike price and the market
price of the underlying stock and multiplying the results by the number of option shares and dividing by CEO total pay (salary + bonus); CEO OWNERSHIP
measures the CEO's stockholdings in the misstating firm at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period and is calculated by dividing the number
of shares owned by the CEO by the number of shares outstanding; BOARD INDEPENDENCE is calculated by dividing the number of outside directors by the total
number of directors both measured at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period; BOARD SIZE is the number of directors serving on the board
measured at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period; CEO TURNOVER is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO was
replaced in the year prior to the end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; CFO TURNOVER is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the CFO was
replaced in the year prior to the end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; CLASSIFIED BOARD is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the board
has two or more classes of directors at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP is
calculated by dividing the number of shares held by institutional owners by the number of shares outstanding, both measured at the end of the year preceding the end
of the misstatement period; AUDIT QUALITY is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has a Big X auditor contracted at the end of the misstated
period and 0 otherwise; LITIGATION RISK is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm operates in a highly litigious sector (financial, health care,
information technology, telecommunication services, or utilities) at the end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; REVENUE RECOGNITION ISSUE is an
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to revenue recognition and 0 otherwise; LEASE ISSUE is
an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to operating or capital leases and 0 otherwise; COST
OF GOODS SOLD ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to cost of goods sold and
0 otherwise; MERGERS & ACQUISITION ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related
to a merger or acquisition and 0 otherwise; SG&A EXPENSES ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the
misstatement was related to selling, general, or administrative expenses and 0 otherwise; DEFERRED TAXES ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of
1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to deferred taxes and 0 otherwise; ACCRUALS ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value
of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to accruals and 0 otherwise; and INTANGIBLE ASSETS ISSUE is an indicator variable that
takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to intangible assets and 0 otherwise; MISSTATEMENT DURATION is the
number of misstated quarters divided by 4; MISSTATEMENT IN INCOME is measured as the cumulative difference between the corrected net income and the asfirst-reported net income over the misstatement duration; POST-SOX ANNOUNCEMENT is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the misstatement
disclosure occurs after August 29, 2002 and 0 otherwise; POST-FINAL-RULE 8-K ANNOUNCEMENT is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the
misstatement disclosure occurs after August 23, 2004 and 0 otherwise; FIRM SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets one year prior to the
end of the misstated period; FIRM LEVERAGE is measured by dividing the firm’s long-term debt by the firm’s total assets both measured one year prior to the end
of the misstated period.
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Table 7
Accounting error sample selection and descriptive statistics
Panel A: Sample selection
Accounting irregularities (initial sample)
Less missing misstatement data
Final sample

2,121
1,026
1,095

Panel B: Descriptive statistics
TIMELINESS
IN-THE-MONEY EXERCISABLE
IN-THE-MONEY UN-EXERCISABLE
CEO OWNERSHIP
BOARD INDEPENDENCE
BOARD SIZE
CEO TURNOVER
CFO TURNOVER
CLASSIFIED BOARD
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP
AUDIT QUALITY
LITIGATION RISK
REVENUE RECOGNITION ISSUE
LEASE ISSUE
INVENTORY ISSUE
MERGERS & ACQUISITION ISSUE
SG&A EXPENSES ISSUE
DEFERRED TAXES ISSUE
ACCRUALS ISSUE
INTANGIBLE ASSETS ISSUE
MISSTATEMENT DURATION
MISSTATEMENT IN INCOME
POST-SOX ANNOUNCEMENT
POST-FINAL-RULE 8-K ANNOUNCEMENT
FIRM SIZE [ln(total assets)]
FIRM LEVERAGE

n
1095
318
318
7
240
240
316
79
152
821
1095
1051
1095
1095
1095
1095
1095
1095
1095
1095
1095
1044
1095
1095
1044
1042

Mean
189.31
4.61
1.64
0.10
0.67
9.35
0.16
0.01
0.64
0.46
0.79
0.51
0.21
0.18
0.10
0.14
0.14
0.11
0.13
0.05
2.05
-0.007
0.86
0.60
5.66
0.20

Standard Deviation
129.65
10.54
2.87
0.12
0.15
2.89
0.36
0.11
0.48
0.33
0.41
0.50
0.40
0.38
0.29
0.34
0.34
0.31
0.34
0.21
1.56
0.053
0.34
0.49
2.19
0.24

25th percentile
121.00
0.08
0.00
0.01
0.57
7.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.14
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.75
-0.002
1.00
0.00
4.14
0.00

Median
145.00
1.42
0.49
0.01
0.70
9.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.46
1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.75
0.000
1.00
1.00
5.66
0.12

75th percentile
213.00
4.54
1.67
0.27
0.80
11.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.75
1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
3.00
0.000
1.00
1.00
7.14
0.31

Table 7 describes the accounting error sample. Continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom one percent with the exception of the dependent
variable (TIMELINESS) to mitigate the influence of outliers.
TIMELINESS measures the number of days between the end of the misstatement period and the misstatement disclosure date; IN-THE-MONEY
EXERCISABLE measures the value of the CEO's in-the-money exercisable stock options at the end of the year preceding the misstatement end date and is
calculated by taking the difference between the option strike price and the market price of the underlying stock and multiplying the results by the number of
option shares and dividing by CEO total pay (salary + bonus); IN-THE-MONEY UN-EXERCISABLE measures the value of the CEO's in-the-money unexercisable stock options at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period and is calculated by taking the difference between the option strike
price and the market price of the underlying stock and multiplying the results by the number of option shares and dividing by CEO total pay (salary + bonus);
CEO OWNERSHIP measures the CEO's stockholdings in the misstating firm at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period and is
calculated by dividing the number of shares owned by the CEO by the number of shares outstanding; BOARD INDEPENDENCE is calculated by dividing the
number of outside directors by the total number of directors both measured at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period; BOARD SIZE
is the number of directors serving on the board measured at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period; CEO TURNOVER is an indicator
variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO was replaced in the year prior to the end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; CFO TURNOVER is an
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the CFO was replaced in the year prior to the end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; CLASSIFIED
BOARD is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the board has two or more classes of directors at the end of the year preceding the end of the
misstatement period and 0 otherwise; INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP is calculated by dividing the number of shares held by institutional owners by the
number of shares outstanding, both measured at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period; AUDIT QUALITY is an indicator variable
that takes the value of 1 if the firm has a Big X auditor contracted at the end of the misstated period and 0 otherwise; LITIGATION RISK is an indicator
variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm operates in a highly litigious sector (financial, health care, information technology, telecommunication services, or
utilities) at the end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; REVENUE RECOGNITION ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the
accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to revenue recognition and 0 otherwise; LEASE ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value
of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to operating or capital leases and 0 otherwise; COST OF GOODS SOLD ISSUE is an
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to cost of goods sold and 0 otherwise; MERGERS
& ACQUISITION ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to a merger or
acquisition and 0 otherwise; SG&A EXPENSES ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement
was related to selling, general, or administrative expenses and 0 otherwise; DEFERRED TAXES ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the
accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to deferred taxes and 0 otherwise; ACCRUALS ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value
of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to accruals and 0 otherwise; and INTANGIBLE ASSETS ISSUE is an indicator variable
that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to intangible assets and 0 otherwise; MISSTATEMENT DURATION
is the number of misstated quarters divided by 4; MISSTATEMENT IN INCOME is measured as the cumulative difference between the corrected net income
and the as-first-reported net income over the misstatement duration; POST-SOX ANNOUNCEMENT is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the
misstatement disclosure occurs after August 29, 2002 and 0 otherwise; POST-FINAL-RULE 8-K ANNOUNCEMENT is an indicator variable that takes the
value of 1 if the misstatement disclosure occurs after August 23, 2004 and 0 otherwise; FIRM SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of the firm’s total
assets one year prior to the end of the misstated period; FIRM LEVERAGE is measured by dividing the firm’s long-term debt by the firm’s total assets both
measured one year prior to the end of the misstated period.
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Table 8
Misstatement disclosure timeliness: Accounting error sample - Proportional Hazard Model (Cox Partial Likelihood)

TIMELINESS 
i



 IN-THE-MONEY EXERCISABLE , IN-THE-MONEY UN-EXERCISABLE , CEO OWNERSHIP ,CEO OWNERSHIP SQUARED , BOARD INDEPENDENCE ,
i

i

i

i

i

BOARD SIZE , CEO TURNOVER , CFO TURNOVER ,CLASSIFIED BOARD ,INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP , AUDIT QUALITY ,LITIGATION RISK ,
i

i

i

i

i

i

i

MISSTATEMENT CHARACTERISTICS , FIRM CHARACTERISTICS , YEAR DUMMIES, INDUSTRY DUMMIES)
i

Independent Variables
IN-THE-MONEY EXERCISABLE
IN-THE-MONEY UN-EXERCISABLE
BOARD INDEPENDENCE
BOARD SIZE
CEO TURNOVER
CFO TURNOVER
CLASSIFIED BOARD
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP
AUDIT QUALITY
LITIGATION RISK
REVENUE RECOGNITION ISSUE
LEASE ISSUE
INVENTORY ISSUE
MERGERS & ACQUISITION ISSUE
SG&A EXPENSES ISSUE
DEFERRED TAXES ISSUE
ACCRUALS ISSUE
INTANGIBLE ASSETS ISSUE
MISSTATEMENT DURATION
MISSTATEMENT IN INCOME
POST-SOX ANNOUNCEMENT
POST-FINAL-RULE 8-K ANNOUNCEMENT
FIRM SIZE [ln(total assets)]
FIRM LEVERAGE
Industry & Year Dummies
Cluster Adj. Std. Errors: Industry
Model Statistics
n
Wald ChiSqd

i

Model 1
E Coef. H. Ratio z stat.
(-)

Model 2
Coef. H. Ratio z stat.

Model 3
Coef. H. Ratio z stat.

(+)
(-)
(+)
(+)
(-)
(+)
(+)

(+)
(-)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(-)

0.09
0.10
0.15
0.02
-0.03
-0.02
-0.22
0.03
0.04
0.09
-0.25
0.33
0.05
-0.10

1.09
1.10
1.16
1.02
0.97
0.98
0.80
1.03
1.04
1.09
0.78
1.40
1.05
0.90

1.31
0.94
2.86
0.18
-0.55
-0.28
-1.75
0.26
2.32
0.13
-2.48
5.25
3.19
-0.95

***

*
**

***
***

No
Yes

0.45
-0.10
0.20
0.00
0.04
0.21
0.00
-0.08
-0.09
-0.18
-0.09
0.04
-1.13
-0.30
0.28
0.01
0.09

1.58
0.90
1.23
1.00
1.04
1.23
1.00
0.92
0.91
0.84
0.91
1.04
0.32
0.74
1.32
1.01
1.09

4.79
-0.94
3.59
-0.05
0.37
1.97
-0.03
-0.99
-0.78
-1.45
-0.72
1.88
-1.00
-2.23
3.82
0.61
0.47

***
***

**

**

***

-0.22
0.03
1.82
0.29
-0.36
0.18
0.29
-0.17
0.19
0.48
-0.79
0.94
0.05
-13.52
-0.44
0.78
0.00
-0.23

No
Yes

1023
444.0 ***

0.80
1.03
6.19
1.34
0.70
1.19
1.33
0.84
1.21
1.61
0.45
2.55
1.05
0.00
0.64
2.19
1.00
0.80

-0.93
0.07
2.52
1.80
-1.54
0.94
0.85
-0.59
0.63
1.02
-2.87
2.04
1.06
-1.50
-0.84
3.19
-0.05
-0.61

Model 4
Coef. H. Ratio z stat.
0.01 1.01
4.03
-0.01 0.99
-0.29

Model 6
Coef. H. Ratio z stat.
0.01 1.01
2.17
0.01 1.01
0.52
0.67 1.96
1.37 *
0.06 1.06
2.15

Model 7
Coef. H. Ratio z stat.
0.01 1.01
1.60
-0.01 0.99
-0.62
1.05 2.85
1.44 *
0.09 1.10
3.26

-0.06
0.35
0.26
-0.21
-0.15
-0.13
-0.33
0.26
0.03
-10.49
-0.45
0.22
0.01
0.05

-0.15
0.78
0.17
-0.09
0.39
0.23
-0.21
-0.02
-0.01
-0.44
0.50
0.03
-12.18
-0.46
0.25
-0.02
0.09

-0.58
0.79
-0.08
0.00
0.32
0.48
-0.18
0.09
-0.21
-0.35
0.54
0.07
-10.93

0.56
2.20
0.92
1.00
1.37
1.61
0.83
1.10
0.81
0.71
1.71
1.07
0.00

-1.23
1.37 *
-0.32
0.00
0.81
1.20
-0.52
0.27
-0.38
-1.30
1.45
0.98
-3.07 ***

-0.09
0.69

0.92
1.99

-1.20
0.64

***
**

***
**
*
***

No
Yes

787
26895.9 ***

Model 5
Coef. H. Ratio z stat.
0.02 1.02
2.91
0.01 1.01
0.60
0.83 2.30
2.03 **
0.06 1.06
2.12

0.12
0.28
0.01
-0.09
-0.06
-0.13
-0.25
0.15
0.03
-7.90
-0.32
0.25
0.09
0.03

1.12
1.32
1.01
0.91
0.94
0.88
0.78
1.16
1.03
0.00
0.72
1.28
1.10
1.03

1.16
2.30
0.03
-0.50
-0.28
-0.44
-1.36
0.96
0.88
-3.43
-1.30
2.05
3.91
0.10

**

***
***
***

No
Yes

133
27077.6 ***

0.94
1.42
1.30
0.81
0.86
0.88
0.72
1.30
1.03
0.00
0.64
1.25
1.01
1.06

-0.47
2.70 ***
0.87
-0.88
-0.57
-0.39
-1.39
1.06
0.49
-4.33 ***
-1.17
1.55 *
0.16
0.12

No
Yes

311
351598.9 ***

0.86
2.18
1.18
0.91
1.48
1.26
0.81
0.98
0.99
0.65
1.65
1.03
0.00
0.63
1.28
0.98
1.10

-0.49
2.51
1.13
-0.64
2.59
0.82
-0.88
-0.08
-0.03
-1.79
1.67
0.44
-5.27
-0.91
1.73
-0.29
0.16

***

***

*
*
***
**

No
Yes

230
8889.2 ***

Yes
Yes

214
13704.0 ***

214
5904.1 ***

Table 8 uses a Cox Partial Likelhood model and provides the resulting hazard ratios representing the influence of internal and external corporate governance on misstatement disclosure timeliness for an accounting error sample. Ties in TIMELINESS are broken using Breslow (1974) approximation.
Continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom one percent with the exception of the dependent variable (TIMELINESS) to mitigate the influence of outliers.
*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively, based on a one-tail test if the expectation is given, else a two-tail test.
TIMELINESS measures the number of days between the end of the misstatement period and the misstatement disclosure date; IN-THE-MONEY EXERCISABLE measures the value of the CEO's in-the-money exercisable stock options at the end of the year preceding the misstatement end date and is
calculated by taking the difference between the option strike price and the market price of the underlying stock and multiplying the results by the number of option shares and dividing by CEO total pay (salary + bonus); IN-THE-MONEY UN-EXERCISABLE measures the value of the CEO's in-the-money
un-exercisable stock options at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period and is calculated by taking the difference between the option strike price and the market price of the underlying stock and multiplying the results by the number of option shares and dividing by CEO total pay
(salary + bonus); BOARD INDEPENDENCE is calculated by dividing the number of outside directors by the total number of directors both measured at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period; BOARD SIZE is the number of directors serving on the board measured at the end of
the year preceding the end of the misstatement period; CEO TURNOVER is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO was replaced in the year prior to the end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; CFO TURNOVER is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the CFO was
replaced in the year prior to the end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; CLASSIFIED BOARD is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the board has two or more classes of directors at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period and 0 otherwise; INSTITUTIONAL
OWNERSHIP is calculated by dividing the number of shares held by institutional owners by the number of shares outstanding, both measured at the end of the year preceding the end of the misstatement period; AUDIT QUALITY is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has a Big X
auditor contracted at the end of the misstated period and 0 otherwise; LITIGATION RISK is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm operates in a highly litigious sector (financial, health care, information technology, telecommunication services, or utilities) at the end of the misstatement
period and 0 otherwise; REVENUE RECOGNITION ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to revenue recognition and 0 otherwise; LEASE ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue
involved in the misstatement was related to operating or capital leases and 0 otherwise; COST OF GOODS SOLD ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to cost of goods sold and 0 otherwise; MERGERS & ACQUISITION
ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to a merger or acquisition and 0 otherwise; SG&A EXPENSES ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to
selling, general, or administrative expenses and 0 otherwise; DEFERRED TAXES ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to deferred taxes and 0 otherwise; ACCRUALS ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1
if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to accruals and 0 otherwise; and INTANGIBLE ASSETS ISSUE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the accounting issue involved in the misstatement was related to intangible assets and 0 otherwise; MISSTATEMENT
DURATION is the number of misstated quarters divided by 4; MISSTATEMENT IN INCOME is measured as the cumulative difference between the corrected net income and the as-first-reported net income over the misstatement duration; POST-SOX ANNOUNCEMENT is an indicator variable that
takes the value of 1 if the misstatement disclosure occurs after August 29, 2002 and 0 otherwise; POST-FINAL-RULE 8-K ANNOUNCEMENT is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the misstatement disclosure occurs after August 23, 2004 and 0 otherwise; FIRM SIZE is measured as the
natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets one year prior to the end of the misstated period; FIRM LEVERAGE is measured by dividing the firm’s long-term debt by the firm’s total assets both measured one year prior to the end of the misstated period.
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